NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 94 | Number 3

Article 3

3-1-2016

Whistleblowers and Financial Innovation
Christina Parajon Skinner

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Christina P. Skinner, Whistleblowers and Financial Innovation, 94 N.C. L. Rev. 861 (2016).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol94/iss3/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

94 N.C. L. REV. 861 (2016)

WHISTLEBLOWERS AND FINANCIAL
INNOVATION*
CHRISTINA PARAJON SKINNER**
This Article critically examines post–financial crisis
whistleblower regimes and their impact on contemporary
financial markets. In particular, the Dodd-Frank whistleblower
program, as implemented by the United States Securities and
Exchange Commission, has received significant attention in legal,
political, and popular quarters. Some praise the whistleblower
program as essential to aiding the government’s efforts in
overcoming enforcement challenges, while others remain wary of
the program’s unintended effects. This Article advances the
debate—in favor of whistleblowers—by offering an updated
analysis of the program’s benefits and costs, in light of recent
trends in complexity and innovation that have made financial
activity much more diffuse.
By weighing the program’s utility in the postcrisis financial
landscape, together with its benefits and costs, this Article argues
that the SEC whistleblower program is, on balance, desirable:
not only because whistleblower solutions can be effective at
detecting financial misconduct in complex financial spaces, but
also because they serve other valuable social and economic goals.
Overall, the aim of this Article is to prompt further conversation
about whistleblower programs by critically examining the crux of
regulators’ need for whistleblowers in the financial services
arena, revisiting a conceptual cost-benefit analysis of the
program, and suggesting certain aspects of the SEC program that
are ripe for revaluation and, potentially, redesign.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2012, a group of traders at JP Morgan Chase lost (at least)
$6 billion trading exotic credit derivatives.1 Led by the infamous
“London Whale”—dubbed so for taking enormous market
positions—the group for years had been engaged in a high-risk, high-

1. JPMorgan Chase Whale Trades: A Case History of Derivatives Risks and Abuses:
Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland
Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong. 1, 3–4 (2013) [hereinafter Senate Hearing,
Whale Trades]. “ ‘Derivatives’ are contractual instruments that derive their value from the
values of underlying instruments or commodities upon which they are based.” JOHN C.
COFFEE, JR., HILLARY A. SALE & M. TODD HENDERSON, SECURITIES REGULATION:
CASES AND MATERIALS 25 (13th ed. 2015).
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reward strategy, essentially betting on the price of certain bonds.2
Eventually, when this strategy started to fare poorly, the Whale
“doubled-down” on his risky position and grew their portfolio to a
“perilous size.”3 Ultimately that strategy collapsed, “shock[ing] the
investing public.”4 Investigations later discovered that the London
Whale’s traders had hidden growing losses from regulatory scrutiny
by manipulating internal risk-valuation models and keeping a
separate accounting to downplay their deteriorating position.5
There has been no shortage of serious financial misconduct in
global institutions and markets since the global financial crisis of
2008.6 In the same year as the London Whale’s losses, regulators in
the United States and abroad discovered that several large, global
2. Eleazar David Melendez, How Did JP Morgan Lose Billions in One Trade? London
‘Whale’ Explained, INT’L BUS. TIMES (May 11, 2012), http://www.ibtimes.com/how-didjpmorgan-lose-billions-one-trade-london-whale-explained-698018 [http://perma.cc/7VS64F6A].
3. Senate Hearing, Whale Trades, supra note 1, at 4 (“In the first quarter of 2012, the
CIO traders went on a sustained trading spree, eventually increasing [their credit
derivatives portfolio] from $51 billion to $157 billion . . . [despite the fact that] the portfolio
was rapidly losing value.”).
4. Id. at 1; see EDWARD V. MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42545, WHAT IS
SYSTEMIC RISK? DOES IT APPLY TO RECENT JP MORGAN LOSSES? 8 (2012), https://www
.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42545.pdf [http://perma.cc/23BH-26PU]. JP Morgan’s $6 billion loss
did not ultimately bring that institution close to insolvency or destabilize the broader
economy. Yet, given the significance and size of that financial institution, larger losses
certainly could have disrupted the global credit and liquidity markets. Id. at 8–9 (noting
that “[t]he Fed’s stress test for JP Morgan [at the time] assumed $56 billion in loan losses
in addition to assuming $28 billion in losses in transactions”).
5. See, e.g., Senate Hearing, Whale Trades, supra note 1, at 3–8; Dan Fitzpatrick, Jean
Eaglesham & Devin Barrett, Two Charged in J.P. Morgan ‘Whale’ Trades, WALL ST. J. (Aug.
14, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324823804579012550859130222
[http://perma.cc/9YAU-76M9 (dark archive)]; Patricia Hurtado, The London Whale,
BLOOMBERG QUICKTAKE (Apr. 23, 2015), http://www.bloombergview.com/quicktake/the
-london-whale [http://perma.cc/E98Q-HBLE]; Ryan Tracy, New York Fed Faulted in
‘London Whale’ Case, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/new-yorkfed-failed-to-examine-j-p-morgan-london-whale-unit-1413900070 [http://perma.cc/YN5BAGLD (dark archive)]; see also James B. Stewart, Convictions Prove Elusive in ‘London
Whale’ Trading Case, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/17
/business/figures-in-london-whale-trading-case-escape-the-authorities-nets.html?_r=0
[http://perma.cc/DL3X-WG3Y] (reporting that the criminal case against the Whale has
been dropped in the United Kingdom).
6. See, e.g., Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency v. Nomura Holding Am., Inc., 104 F. Supp. 3d
441, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); see also COMM. ON BANKING, HOUS. & URBAN AFFAIRS, THE
RESTORING AMERICAN FINANCIAL STABILITY ACT OF 2010, S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 43
(2d Sess. 2010) [hereinafter SEN. REP. ON FINANCIAL STABILITY] (explaining how
complex financial products, left unchecked, fanned the flames of the crisis, owing to
“[g]aps in the regulatory structure [that] allowed these risks and products to flourish
outside the view of those responsible for overseeing the financial system”); Christina
Parajon Skinner, Misconduct Risk, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1559, 1576–88 (2016) (discussing
misconduct as a market-wide risk).
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banks had been for years manipulating international interest rate
benchmarks and—in a separate scandal—the market for foreign
exchange currency.7 Most recently, in September 2015, twelve major
global banks settled civil claims that they had been conspiring to fix
prices in the market for credit default swaps.8
With finite regulatory resources, detecting financial misconduct
is a perennial challenge.9 Manpower constraints are, as always, a
limiting factor. As William Dudley, President and CEO of the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York (“New York Fed”), recently
explained: “[s]upervisors simply do not have sufficient ‘boots on the
ground’ to ferret out all forms of bad behavior within a giant, global,
financial institution.”10 Regulators also lack real-time information and
up-to-date expertise necessary to anticipate misconduct on the
horizon. As financial activity becomes increasingly innovative and
much more diffuse, these resource deficiencies will inevitably
continue to grow.
One partial solution is to enlist help from the private sector.11 In
that vein, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Consumer Protection Act

7. THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, THE WHEATLEY REVIEW OF LIBOR: FINAL REPORT 5
(2012); The Libor Investigation, WALL ST. J., http://stream.wsj.com/story/the-liborinvestigation/SS-2-32262 (last visited Mar. 4, 2016) [http://perma.cc/6BGF-GKTE]; Chad
Bray, Jenny Anderson & Ben Protess, Big Banks Are Fined $4.25 Billion in Inquiry into
Currency-Rigging, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/11/12/british
-and-u-s-regulators-fine-big-banks-3-16-billion-in-foreign-exchange-scandal
[http://perma.cc
/463S-ZK7S]; Six Banks Fined £2.6bn by Regulators over Forex Failings, BBC NEWS (Nov. 12,
2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-30016007 [http://perma.cc/8CZS-G5SF].
8. Jonathan Stempel, Big Banks Just Paid $1.9 Billion to Settle Claims They
Manipulated Another Market, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 11, 2015), http://www.businessinsider
.com/big-banks-in-19-billion-swaps-price-fixing-settlement-2015-9 [http://perma.cc/ZW4JP3GT].
9. See, e.g., Tracy, supra note 5. The SEC, however, is “actively recruiting more
brainpower to tackle complex product markets.” Matt Scully, SEC: Banks May Be Shifting
Asset Risk for Better Capital Treatment, AM. BANKER (Oct. 22, 2014), http://www
.americanbanker.com/issues/179_204/sec-banks-may-be-shifting-asset-risk-for-bettercapital-treatment-1070747-1.html [http://perma.cc/P3DR-FL2H (dark archive)]. According
to those with industry knowledge, those partnerships are believed to be a “game-changer.”
Id. A 2010 study by economist Alexander Dyck and co-authors found that of 216 major
incidents of financial misconduct between 1996 and 2004, the SEC detected only seven
percent of them. Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse & Luigi Zingales, Who Blows the Whistle
on Corporate Fraud?, 65 J. FIN. 2213, 2213–14 (2010).
10. William C. Dudley, Enhancing Financial Stability by Improving Culture in the
Financial Services Industry, FED. RES. BANK N.Y. (Oct. 20, 2014), http://www.newyorkfed
.org/newsevents/speeches/2014/dud141020a.html [http://perma.cc/WPE2-FUPR].
11. Michael Walsh, an assistant Vice President in the New York Fed’s legal and
compliance group, put the point plainly: “[i]f people are expecting my group of 40 to
understand every single risk without the help of the [financial] institutions, that’s an
impossible task.” Justin Baer, Top Wall Street Lawyer Slams Regulatory Environment,
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of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”) adopted a whistleblower program, to be
implemented by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or
“Commission”).12 Whistleblowers in this scheme are rewarded with
cash bounties for providing original information to the SEC that leads
to a successful enforcement action. In establishing this program,
Congress believed that private market insiders could aid the SEC in
overcoming its resource limitations, on the rationale that individuals
working within these financial institutions and markets are well
equipped to detect malfeasance.13
Yet despite its surface appeal, reactions to the SEC
whistleblower program have been mixed. On the one hand, regulators
are optimistic about the program. SEC Chair Mary Jo White has
praised it as “enormously successful.”14 With similar enthusiasm,
former Attorney General Eric Holder spoke publicly in favor of
expanding an SEC-type whistleblower program to the criminal
arena.15 The private sector, however, is more reserved. Some industry
stakeholders are concerned that, among other things, the program has
and will interfere with internal corporate compliance initiatives.16
Others suggest that cash incentives are morally corrupting, or, at the
least, promote frivolous (even vengeful) reporting. And so today, four
years into the program’s existence, the question of whether the

WALL ST. J. (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/top-wall-street-lawyer-slamsregulatory-environment-1426718956 [http://perma.cc/V9G4-G9RP].
12. The SEC promulgated its whistleblower program under section 21F of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78u-6, which was added by section 922 of the
Dodd-Frank Act. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (DoddFrank) Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, sec. 922, § 21F, 124 Stat. 1376, 1841–49 (2010) (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012)).
13. See SEN. REP. ON FINANCIAL STABILITY, supra note 6, at 110–11.
14. Barbara Shecter, SEC Chair Mary Jo White Praises ‘Enormously Successful’
Whistleblower Program, FIN. POST (Oct. 16, 2014), http://business.financialpost.com/news
/fp-street/sec-chair-mary-jo-white-praises-enormously-successful-whistleblower-program
[http://perma.cc/P3M8-MNCC].
15. Devlin Barrett, Holder Proposes Bigger Rewards for Wall Street Whistleblowers,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 17, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/attorney-general-holder-topropose-big-new-rewards-for-wall-street-whistleblowers-1410957241?alg=y [http://perma
.cc/FWQ4-ZCQW (dark archive)].
16. See John T. Zach & Randall W. Jackson, The Challenge of Misplaced
Whistleblower Incentives, N.Y. L.J. (Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id
=1202738010670/The-Challenge-of-Misplaced-Whistleblower-Incentives?slreturn
=20160009130751 [http://perma.cc/VT8Y-QBQ5] (“If reported to the company, key factual
allegations can be quickly verified (or discredited), relevant individuals can be interviewed
and key documentary evidence can be reviewed. The SEC’s enforcement staff, by practice
necessarily influenced by past experience, cannot assess allegations with such precision or
efficiency.”).
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program serves the public interest—and if so, at an appropriate cost—
remains open.
This Article seeks to advance the ongoing debate about
whistleblower programs in two ways. First, it revisits some of the costs
and benefits postulated at the beginning of the SEC program, with an
analysis that is updated in light of the financial landscape today.17
Second, this Article adds a transnational regulatory dimension to the
analysis in order to more completely inform the domestic debate. To
those ends, the Article proceeds in three parts. Part I reorients the
debate about whistleblowers by illustrating why, in this postcrisis era
of innovative finance, regulators need to draw on private insiders to
adequately enforce the securities laws. Three case studies in financial
innovation are used to demonstrate circumstances in which
whistleblowers are helpful—and sometimes indispensable—adjuncts
to state power. Based on these cases, Part I argues that, as a baseline,
whistleblower programs are worthy additions to the financial
regulators’ toolkit.
From that baseline, Part II engages in a conceptual cost-benefit
analysis of whistleblower programs. It considers a few of the more
salient costs of whistleblower programs: the inefficiencies they impose
on the private market and (potentially) their ability to fuel antisocial
relationships. Part II also considers the realized and potential benefits
of whistleblower programs, such as the increased detection of
misconduct, enhanced efficiency in the use of finite government
resources, heightened legitimacy of the financial services sector,
increased opportunity for market discipline, and improvement in
industry culture. Upon weighing the costs against the benefits, Part II
17. Compare Sundar Narayanan, Are Whistleblower Reward Programs Really a Good
Idea?, FCPA BLOG (Nov. 30, 2015, 10:08 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2015/11/30
/are-whistleblower-reward-programs-really-a-good-idea.html [http://perma.cc/5EVM-FY45],
with Gordon Schnell, Gordon Schnell: Yes, We Need Whistleblower Rewards, FCPA BLOG
(Dec. 3, 2015, 10:18 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2015/12/3/gordon-schnell-yes-weneed-whistleblower-rewards.html [http://perma.cc/756Q-UJ8D]. For existing postcrisis
literature on financial whistleblower laws, see, for example, Dave Ebersole, Comment,
Blowing the Whistle on the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions, 6 OHIO ST.
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 123, 125–27 (2011); Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Mutiny by
the Bounties? The Attempt to Reform Wall Street by the New Whistleblower Provisions of
the Dodd-Frank Act, 2012 BYU L. REV. 73, 76–104 (2012); Amanda M. Rose, Better
Bounty Hunting: How the SEC’s New Whistleblower Program Changes the Securities Fraud
Class Action Debate, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1235, 1260–85 (2014). For a general discussion of
qui tam lawsuits brought under the False Claims Act, see David Freeman Engstrom,
Harnessing the Private Attorney General: Evidence from Qui Tam Litigation, 112 COLUM.
L. REV. 1244 (2012). For an excellent discussion of complexity and innovation in financial
markets more generally, see Dan Awrey, Complexity, Innovation, and the Regulation of
Modern Financial Markets, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235, 238–42 (2012).
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suggests that a strong and well-incentivized whistleblower program,
along the Dodd-Frank model, can advance social welfare and
economic efficiency.
Part III then discusses the implications of Parts I and II.
Specifically, it points to several potential design flaws or weaknesses
of the Dodd-Frank whistleblower program and suggests possible,
albeit preliminary, modifications to the program for regulators to
consider.
I. WHISTLEBLOWERS IN A POSTCRISIS WORLD
Finance today is increasingly innovative and diffuse, which
characteristics pose particular challenges for securities law
enforcement.18 Where regulators lack expertise in a new and often
complex financial area, misconduct can be more difficult to anticipate.
Meanwhile, as financial activity spreads well beyond traditional
financial institutions, monitoring these disperse spaces will also
stretch regulators’ resources thin.
This Part draws attention to two fast-growing areas of the
financial services sector—securitization and structured finance
(particularly in the shadow banking system) and financial
technology—to illustrate why securities regulators, on their own, have
difficulty detecting misconduct as it arises today. Through these
various examples, Section I.A shows possible gaps in regulators’
capacity to anticipate and detect misconduct. Section I.B then turns to
the specific details of the Dodd-Frank whistleblower program and
explains the program’s potential to aid the SEC in narrowing these
gaps.
A. Regulatory Gaps: A Case Study
This Section provides a brief case study in innovation and
diffusion. The aim of this study is to highlight—and in some cases,
foreshadow—regulatory challenges to come, as an increasing
proportion of financial activity takes place beyond regulators’
expertise and, in some cases, supervisory purview.

18. See, e.g., Robert P. Bartlett, III, Making Banks Transparent, 65 VAND. L. REV.
293, 298–311 (2012); Kathryn Judge, Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial
Innovation, Complexity, and Systemic Risk, 64 STAN. L. REV. 657, 657–63 (2012).
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1. Shadow Banking19
Traditionally, banks provide credit to consumers and companies
in a relatively straightforward way: banks take short-term deposits
and from those deposits make longer-term loans.20 Today, however, a
substantial amount of this activity—called financial intermediation—
takes place through securitization.21 As one commentator at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis noted, “[i]n modern banking,
origination of loans is done mostly with a view to convert the loan
into securities—a practice called securitization, whereby the
transaction, processing and servicing fees are the intermediaries’
principal source of revenue.”22
Unlike the basic two-step process of deposit-taking and loanmaking, securitization takes place in a sequence of complex steps
and—potentially—by a number of institutions: (1) a loan (e.g., a
student loan, mortgage, or auto loan) is originated by a regulated
commercial bank or an unregulated finance company; (2) the loan is
then sold to a “warehouse bank”—called an “aggregator, seller or
sponsor” (which can be the same as the originator); (3) the
“administrator” creates a special purpose vehicle (“SPV”) that issues
securities against these loans; (4) the underwriter (typically an
investment bank) sells the securities to investors, who get payments
from the securities in their order of priority.23 As this assembly-line
process suggests, securitization can be a diffuse activity. Much of it
takes place outside of the traditionally regulated banking sector—or
at least not under a single bank’s roof—in the so-called shadow
banking system.24

19. See Judge, supra note 18, at 659 (coining the term “fragmentation nodes” to refer
to securitization and related complex financial products).
20. See ZOLTAN POZSAR ET AL., SHADOW BANKING 3 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.,
Staff Report No. 458, 2010) (2013).
21. In particular, credit intermediation involves (1) credit transformation, “the
enhancement of the credit quality of debt issued by the intermediary through the use of
priority of claims”; (2) maturity transformation, “the use of short term deposits to fund
long-term loans”; and (3) liquidity transformation, “the use of liquid assets” (i.e., deposits)
“to fund illiquid assets” (i.e., mortgages). Id. at 3–4.
22. Bryan J. Noeth & Rajdeep Sengupta, Is Shadow Banking Really Banking?,
REGIONAL ECONOMIST, Oct. 2011, at 8, 10–11.
23. Id. at 11. In some cases, most of these steps can happen under the aegis of a large
investment bank.
24. See Noeth & Sengupta, supra note 22, at 9 (“[W]hat was once accomplished under
a single roof in the traditional banking system is now done over a sequence of steps in the
shadow banking system, each performed by specialized entities that are not vertically
integrated.”). The term “shadow banking” was first used by Paul McCulley of the PIMCO
investment fund. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT, SHADOW
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In general, shadow banking intermediates credit “through a wide
range of securitization and secured funding techniques, including
asset-backed commercial paper (CP), asset-backed securities (ABS),
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), and repurchase agreements
(repos).”25 Included in the broad definition are the range of “financial
intermediaries” that engage in these various credit intermediation
functions, but unlike the traditional banking sector, may lack access
to the Federal Reserve discount window and other public
guarantees.26
They
include,
among
others,
“finance
companies, . . . credit hedge funds, [and] money market mutual
funds.”27 And unlike the traditional banking sector, the shadow
banking system is expanding at a rapid pace. According to the
Financial Stability Board’s (“FSB”) 2013 report, the global shadow
banking sector accounted for $71.2 trillion of assets at the end of
2012, equivalent to fifty-two percent of regulated banking assets in
the report’s sample of twenty global jurisdictions plus the Eurozone
overall.28

BANKING AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 9, n.8 (2010), http://fcicstatic.law.stanford.edu/cdn
_media/fcic-reports/2010-0505-Shadow-Banking.pdf [http://perma.cc/L2US-E8Y9].
25. POZSAR ET AL., supra note 20, at 1. Returning to the securitization sequence set
out above, Pozsar and co-authors explain the role of various shadow banking entities in a
securitization process: (1) loan origination by “finance companies”; (2) loan warehousing
by “single- and multi-seller conduits”; (3) pooling/structuring of the loans into securities
by broker-dealers at ABS syndicate desks; (4) ABS warehousing funded through repos;
(5) pooling/structuring of ABS into CDOs by broker-dealers’ ABS desks; (6) ABS
intermediation by “limited-purpose finance companies, structured investment vehicles
(SIVs), securities arbitrage conduits, and credit hedge funds”; (7) funding of all of these
activities through wholesale funding markets. Id. at 7.
26. Noeth & Sengupta, supra note 22, at 8.
27. Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Shadow Banking, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 619,
621 (2012). Former Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke defined shadow
banking as “compris[ing] a diverse set of institutions and markets that, collectively, carry out
traditional banking functions—but do so outside, or in ways only loosely linked to, the
traditional system of regulated depository institutions.” Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Some Reflections on the Crisis and the Policy Response
3 (Apr. 13, 2012), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20120413a.pdf
[http://perma.cc/2RYG-V582]. With respect to money market funds, these institutions
have become more heavily regulated by the SEC under the Investment Company Act of
1940. See Money Market Fund Reform, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,132, 75
Fed. Reg. 10,060, 10,060 (Mar. 4, 2010).
28. FIN. STABILITY BD., GLOBAL SHADOW BANKING MONITORING REPORT 2013, at
8, 12 (2013); see FIN. STABILITY BD., GLOBAL SHADOW BANKING MONITORING REPORT
2015, at 7–11 (2015). While the United States and United Kingdom have the largest
shadow banking systems, shadow banking has also grown significantly in other emerging
economies. IMF, RISK TAKING, LIQUIDITY, AND SHADOW BANKING, Global Financial
Stability Report, at 66 (Oct. 2014).
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The rapid growth of the securitization market is a double-edged
sword. While beneficial in terms of risk spreading, the process—
particularly when concentrated in the shadow banking system—can
make regulatory monitoring for misconduct quite difficult. For one,
securitization can give rise to a type of moral hazard. As Pozsar and
co-authors have written, securitization-based credit intermediation
“creates agency problems that do not exist when these activities are
conducted within a bank.”29 For example, with only a slice of the
product to manage—and then move along—no one actor (individual
or institutional) is sufficiently vested in the integrity of the whole. As
discussed below, “[i]f these agency problems are not adequately
mitigated, the financial system is prone to excessive lowering of
underwriting standards and to overly aggressive structuring of
securities.”30
The financial crisis is a prime example. In the years preceding the
financial crisis, the market for mortgage-backed securities (“MBS”)
boomed.31 The underlying asset in these MBS, in many cases,
consisted of subprime mortgage loans that had been originated with
poor underwriting standards and diligence by the institutions that
purchased them. To make matters worse, a market in derivative
products was created, including collateralized debt obligations
(“CDO”)—bundles of MBS collateralized by the promise to repay
the underlying subprime loans32—and credit default swaps (“swaps”
or “CDS”)—used as “insurance for subprime [mortgage] exposure.”33
29. POZSAR ET AL., supra note 20, at 3; see also David C. Wheelock & Paul W.
Wilson, Explaining Bank Failures: Deposit Insurance, Regulation, and Efficiency, 77 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 689, 690 (1995) (discussing the results from a study on bank failures in
Kansas during the 1920s resulting from widespread farm mortgage defaults).
30. POZSAR ET AL., supra note 20, at 3.
31. MBS are structured financial products in which mortgages are bundled into
tranches. Mortgage-Backed Securities, SEC (July 23, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/answers
/mortgagesecurities.htm [http://perma.cc/W9Z9-8AHR]. Banks sell these tranches as a type
of security. Id. Securitization, classically or legitimately, is used to spread risk. But prior to
the crisis, securitization was used in an inventive way in order “not to share risk with
investors, but to make an end run around capital-adequacy regulations.” See Viral V.
Acharya & Matthew Richardson, Causes of the Financial Crisis, 21 CRITICAL REV. 195,
196–97 (2009).
32. See Definition of Collateralised Debt Obligation CDO, FIN. TIMES, http://lexicon.ft
.com/Term?term=Collateralised-debt-obligation-CDO [http://perma.cc/GUV8-MWHV].
33. René M. Stulz, Credit Default Swaps and the Credit Crisis, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 73,
77 (2010); see SEN. REP. ON FINANCIAL STABILITY, supra note 6, at 29–30, 43. In the
Senate Committee Report, Congress pointed out that the decision not to regulate
derivatives, especially credit default swaps, exacerbated the crisis. Id. at 29–30, 43. That
report referenced statements made by the Obama Administration that “the downside of
this lax regulatory regime . . . became disastrously clear during the recent financial crisis”
where investors had large positions in these unregulated products that ultimately “saddled
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Ultimately, investors were harmed. In some cases, banks
misrepresented the nature of the underlying subprime mortgage
loans.34 In others, banks may have failed to disclose the magnitude of
their exposure to the volatile mortgage market.35 Gaps in regulatory
expertise and monitoring may have been partly to blame.36 As
Congress noted, “[t]he system [had] operated on a wholesale
misunderstanding of, or complete disregard for the risks inherent in
the underlying assets and the complex instruments they were
backing.”37 Notably, these examples of misconduct in connection with
securitized products reflect only that which was eventually uncovered
in the large, well-regulated financial institutions. Misconduct at
various other intermediaries in the securitization pipeline is invariably
much more difficult to anticipate and detect.38 As Tomasz Piskorski
and co-authors point out,
[m]arket rules and regulations . . . require disclosure of
information and prohibit misleading statements on the financial
products being manufactured by intermediaries . . . [but] the
nature of intermediation has changed dramatically over the past
decade, with the introduction of more agents in the supply
chain of credit . . . potentially weakening the ability of existing

our financial system with an enormous—and largely unrecognized—level of risk.” Id. at
29–30 (emphasis added) (quoting DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY
REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION 47 (2009)).
34. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency v. Nomura Holding Am., Inc., 104 F. Supp. 3d 441, 453
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“This case is complex from almost any angle, but at its core there is a
single, simple question. Did defendants accurately describe the home mortgages in the
Offering Documents for the securities they sold that were backed by those mortgages?
Following trial, the answer to that question is clear. The Offering Documents did not
correctly describe the mortgage loans.”).
35. See David Zaring, Litigating the Financial Crisis, 100 VA. L. REV. 1405, 1448, 1450
(2014) (noting that although CDOs were erroneously marketed as safe products, it is
difficult to tell whether these assets failed because of “improper engineering” or “the
general downturn in the economy”). Also, in 2013, finance economists Tomasz Piskorski,
Amit Seru, and James Witkin collected and analyzed data on mortgage asset fraud in
connection with the financial crisis. Tomasz Piskorski, Amit Seru & James Witkin, Asset
Quality Misrepresentation by Financial Intermediaries: Evidence from the RMBS Market,
70 J. FIN. 2635, 2635–36 (2015). They found “a significant propensity of reputable banks to
sell misrepresented loans during the housing market boom” and that “[t]his behavior also
appears to have largely escaped regulators in charge of safeguarding the rights of
investors.” Id. at 2674–75.
36. James Crotty, Structural Causes of the Global Financial Crisis: A Critical
Assessment of the ‘New Financial Architecture’, 33 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 563, 567–68
(2009) (noting that banks “stockpile[d]” these assets despite a lack of understanding
within the industry, regulators included).
37. SEN. REP. ON FINANCIAL STABILITY, supra note 6, at 43.
38. See Judge, supra note 18, at 684–90.
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market arrangements and regulatory oversight to ensure
truthful disclosure of asset quality.39
In short, as innovation in securitization advances and expands,
regulators’ capacity to detect misconduct in the securitization
business will continue to be stretched.
Consider just one hypothetical looming large on the horizon.
Recently, the market for auto-loan ABS has grown considerably. The
sector originated $97.8 billion of loans in 2015,40 bringing the total
outstanding to somewhere around $170 billion.41 Strikingly, issuance
volume represents a twenty-five percent increase from 2014, while
credit card debt and other consumer finance products have remained
flat.42 These signs suggest that a bubble may be brewing, fueled by
“competition among lenders keen on getting in on lucrative
securitizations,” and creating the same sorts of opportunities for
misconduct that arose prior to the recent financial crisis.43 In the autoABS market, just like most other securitized product markets, lengthy
and prolix disclosure documents detail a number of complex
processes in connection with originating and bundling loans, which
responsibilities are spread across multiple actors along a financial
product assembly line.44 To the extent this securitization activity is,
again, occurring outside of the large, well-regulated banks, regulatory
resources to monitor for misconduct will likely be spread thin.45
39. Piskorski et al., supra note 35, at 2635.
40. U.S. ABS Issuance and Outstanding, SIFMA (2016), http://www.sifma.org
/uploadedFiles/Research/Statistics/StatisticsFiles/SF-US-ABS-SIFMA.xls?n=84917 [http://
perma.cc/8KQM-5BJV (staff-uploaded archive)]; see Tyler Durden, Don’t Look Now, but
the Subprime Auto Bubble May Be Bursting, ZERO HEDGE (Aug. 13, 2015),
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-08-13/dont-look-now-subprime-auto-bubble-may-be
-bursting [http://perma.cc/4UCC-EQFQ].
41. SIFMA, supra note 40. According to an industry source, the total ABS market is
$1.387 trillion—$705 billion excluding CDOs and housing-related ABSs. Id.
42. Durden, supra note 40.
43. Id.
44. See Judge, supra note 18, at 659–60.
45. Awrey, supra note 17, at 284 & n.272 (noting that “the Dodd-Frank Act also seeks
to enhance the regulation of ABS and other securitizations—including, importantly, those
offered under exemptions from the prospectus and registration requirements under the
Securities Act” (emphasis omitted)); Durden, supra note 40; see also Dodd-Frank Act,
§ 941(a), § 77, 124 Stat. 1376, 1890 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(77) 2012))
(defining an “asset-backed security”); id. § 941(b) (defining “securitizer”); id. sec. 942(b),
§ 7(c) (increasing disclosure requirements surrounding underlying assets in ABS); AssetBacked Securities, SEC (Nov. 23, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank
/assetbackedsecurities.shtml [http://perma.cc/6WFQ-ALNC]. The Commission passed
rules in August 2014, known as Regulation AB II, that require issuers of asset-backed
securities (backed by auto loans among others) to disclose detailed information about the
loans underlying the securities. See Asset-Backed Securities Disclosure and Registration,

94 N.C. L. REV. 861 (2016)

2016]

WHISTLEBLOWERS & INNOVATION

873

From this vantage point, it is not surprising that regulators are
concerned about the shadow banking system and debating whether
more regulation is needed.46 So far, however, much of that
conversation has focused on regulators’ ability simply to understand
(and possibly curb) the activities of the bespoke institutions, many of
which operate without the same kinds of supervision or regulations
that are imposed on traditional banks (like capital adequacy
requirements).47 As the crisis well illustrated, a regulatory handle over
the entire securitization process—including each of these shadow
bank intermediaries—is of key importance to the stability of the
financial system.48 But the sheer size and scope of the shadow banking
system makes a detailed understanding of that sector—let alone a
robust capacity to detect abuses within it—difficult for regulators to
accomplish alone.49
2. Technology
The proliferation of financial technology in the past several years
also presents challenges for securities regulation and enforcement.
Two technological developments in particular—fintech and
crowdfunding—demonstrate the ramping up of financial technology

Securities Act Release No. 9638, Exchange Act Release No. 72,982, 79 Fed. Reg. 57,184,
57,184 (Sept. 24, 2014).
46. Michael Flaherty & Howard Schneider, U.S. Regulators Struggle in Effort to Tackle
Shadow Banking, REUTERS (Apr. 1, 2015, 1:27 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04
/01/usa-fed-shadowbanks-idUSL3N0WY4O420150401#UHvyzRgyAYo1RG8c.97/
[http://perma.cc/9BB4-8HL8]; see also Ryan Tracy, SEC Official: ‘Not Clear’ Bank
Regulation Has Made Economy Safer, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 1, 2015, 8:29 PM), http://blogs
.wsj.com/moneybeat/2015/04/01/sec-official-not-clear-bank-regulation-has-made-economysafer [http://perma.cc/7FMP-97VJ (dark archive)] (reporting that Fed Vice Chairman
Stanley Fischer “floated several ideas for regulating shadow banks, some of which might
take SEC action to implement”).
47. See Huw Jones, Regulators Lack Data to Probe Shadow Banking Sector, REUTERS
(May 2, 2014, 8:49 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-regulations-shadowbanksidUSBREA410EM20140502#7jKlLJriOZJTzoQq.97 [http://perma.cc/NQ9E-CVP2].
48. See EDWARD V. MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43087, WHO REGULATES
WHOM AND HOW? AN OVERVIEW OF U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY POLICY FOR
BANKING AND SECURITIES MARKETS 9 (2015), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43087
.pdf [http://perma.cc/T72S-R4SM] (explaining that “activities being called shadow banking
are often still subject to securities regulation,” but “[t]he reach of financial regulators to
address policy problems in shadow banking varies from activity to activity and from class
of firm to class of firm”).
49. Id.; cf. Matthew Goldstein, Whistle-Blower on Countrywide Mortgage Misdeeds to Get
$57 Million, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/12/17/countrywidewhistle-blower-to-receive-more-than-57-million/?_r=1 [http://perma.cc/2AWH-3SB6]
(discussing the importance of whistleblowing and insider information in federal
prosecutors’ claims against Bank of America).
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and innovation in a postcrisis world and the gaps in regulation and
supervision that exist.
Financial technology includes a relatively new “fintech” sector,
that is a recent wave of startups focused on technological innovation
in finance, many of which are based in New York City. The products
that fintech startups are creating run the gamut from financial
services (like platforms providing for location-based commerce and
peer-to-peer social payments) to cybersecurity (including platforms
designed to combat new threats, such as cyberhacking).50
The fintech sector has become a global attraction. In fact, global
financing activity in U.S. fintech firms attracted almost $1 billion in
capital and a record 109 closed deals in the first quarter of 2014.51
Additional figures show that global investment in fintech grew four
times faster than overall investments from venture capital firms in the
past three years.52 From 2010 to 2014, investment in U.S. fintech rose
from $1.64 billion to $9.89 billion.53 As one industry report stated,
“The financial services industry is more focused on technology
innovation than at any other point in its history . . . .”54
While many financial technology firms and products no doubt
expand consumer choice and lower the price of financial services—
classic economic “goods”—the sweep of financial technology presents
new challenges from a regulatory perspective. For one, it may be
difficult for regulators to keep pace with developments in how risk is
transferred, shared, or created, as large institutions develop or
partner with new technology ventures.55 For example, some large
financial firms have developed creative “third-party initiatives” with
smaller fintech firms, or have themselves spun-off their own
innovation labs that may technically be exempt from the established
rules.56 Thus some growth of the financial technology sector may
increase financial diffusion and industry evolution in a way that
strains regulatory supervision and assessment.
50.
51.
52.
53.

ACCENTURE & P’SHIP FUND FOR N.Y.C., THE RISE OF FINTECH 4 (2014).
Id.
Id.
Penny Crosman, Meteoric Rise of Startups Evident at Fintech Demo Day, AM.
BANKER (June 26, 2015), http://www.americanbanker.com/news/bank-technology/meteoricrise-of-startups-evident-at-fintech-demo-day-1075121-1.html [http://perma.cc/AEH9-6L79].
54. ACCENTURE & P’SHIP FUND FOR N.Y.C., supra note 50, at 4.
55. Id. at 5; Crosman, supra note 53.
56. ACCENTURE & P’SHIP FUND FOR N.Y.C., supra note 50, at 5. But see Jonathan
Rogers & Peter Wilson, Old Laws, New Models: UK Regulation of FinTech,
TAYLORWESSING (Oct. 2014), http://www.taylorwessing.com/download/article_uk_reg
_fintech.html [http://perma.cc/3SH3-G96J] (describing the emerging regulatory framework
for fintech in the United Kingdom).
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More generally, technology in finance may also give rise to
opportunity for consumer abuse, particularly in connection with the
sale of private technology stocks—that is, before those companies go
public. The SEC is watching this area closely for irregularity,
specifically with respect to whether the transactions involve securities
swaps and are violating registration requirements.57 These regulators’
concern is that, as a means of avoiding securities law restrictions on
stock sales, certain “middlemen are designing derivatives that deliver
payments . . . based on [the] stock’s perceived value.”58 But since
many of these private tech companies do not widely and publicly
disclose their financial information, the “[p]rices used in these private
sales can be based on little more than a guess.”59 As these financial
commentators put it, “financial middlemen . . . are creating a murky,
ad hoc market where the red-hot stocks of closely held technology
companies trade largely out of sight of regulators, other investors and
the companies themselves.”60
Crowdfunding is another aspect of the ongoing revolution in
financial technology. Crowdfunding involves “raising many small
amounts of money from a large number of people”61 for small or
startup businesses.62 The crowdfunding model of capital raising relies
on Internet platforms (crowdfunding sites) to raise money from the
general public, again, accumulating small contributions from many
57. See, e.g., SEC Files Subpoena Enforcement Action Against Netcirq, LLC for Failure
to Produce Documents, Litigation Release No. 23,418, 2015 WL 7873435 (Dec. 3, 2015);
Susan Pulliam & Telis Demos, SEC Steps Up Probe of Pre-IPO Share Trading, WALL ST. J.
(Dec. 1, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-steps-up-probe-of-pre-ipo-share-trading1449020518 [http://perma.cc/X89F-VR5M (dark archive)]; see also Susan Pulliam & Telis
Demos, How Wall Street Middlemen Help Silicon Valley Employees Cash In Early, WALL
ST. J. (Mar. 27, 2015, 4:41 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-wall-street-middlemen-helpsilicon-valley-employees-cash-in-early-1427474284 [http://perma.cc/4L4Z-M7AG (staffuploaded archive)] [hereinafter Pulliam & Demos, Middlemen]; Susan Pulliam & Telis
Demos, Regulators Probe Marketing of Hot Private Tech Shares, WALL ST. J. (July 5, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/regulators-probe-marketing-of-hot-private-tech-shares1436139252 [http://perma.cc/EE4Z-D8KQ (staff-uploaded archive)].
58. Pulliam & Demos, Middlemen, supra note 57.
59. Id. The prospect of fraud is certainly not only hypothetical. Already, there are
three cases of alleged misleading of investors and failure to disclose fees before Facebook
went public. Id. In March of 2015, prosecutors charged a Buffalo man with criminal fraud
for persuading an investor to give $5 million to a venture capital fund that said it would
buy Uber shares, but used the money to pay other investors. Id.
60. Id.
61. Tanya Prive, What Is Crowdfunding and How Does It Benefit the Economy, FORBES
(Nov. 27, 2012, 10:50 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tanyaprive/2012/11/27/what-iscrowdfunding-and-how-does-it-benefit-the-economy [http://perma.cc/A3ZQ-LMTG (staffuploaded archive)].
62. See C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Law, 2012
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 1, 5 (2012).
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investors.63 For small businesses, crowdfunding provides access to a
pool of capital that would otherwise be difficult to obtain;64 for
investors, it makes participation in financial markets—in various
forms—more accessible.65
Like fintech, crowdfunding has also become a global
phenomenon. Crowdfunding websites have popped up all over the
world, including the United States, Canada, New Zealand, Europe,
and Kenya.66 In a similar vein, crowdfunding is becoming increasingly
globalized—at least one British crowdfunding site has opened its
investment opportunities across Europe (the first to offer crossborder investment).67 More recently, a Canadian equity crowdfunding
site also offered a cross-border equity opportunity for the first time in
that country.68 Crowdfunding comes in various forms, perhaps most
commonly providing “rewards” (e.g., a product) or securities.69
Where “investment crowdfunding” is concerned—equity stock is
offered—such fundraising efforts fall under the scope of the U.S.
securities laws.70 However, in 2012, in an effort to stimulate the
63. Id.
64. The costs of an initial public offering (“IPO”) and “being public” are substantial. See
PWC, CONSIDERING AN IPO? THE COSTS OF GOING AND BEING PUBLIC MAY SURPRISE
YOU 12–13 (2012), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/deals/publications/assets/pwc-cost-of-ipo.pdf
[http://perma.cc/6RXZ-QRZS] (“The process of undertaking an initial public offering is
rigorous, time-consuming, and expensive. Many companies, having spent months
exhausting their human and financial resources, view the completion of an IPO as the
finish line. In reality, this is just the beginning of their new life as a public company[, which
includes ongoing reporting and disclosure requirements.]”).
65. See Bradford, supra note 62, at 5.
66. Wil Schroter, Crowdfunding Around the World, FORBES (July 9, 2014),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/wilschroter/2014/07/09/crowdfunding-around-the-world
[http://perma.cc/CV7W-MYUA (staff-uploaded archive)].
67. Kylie Maclellan, British Crowdfunding Site to Allow Cross-Border Investment,
REUTERS (Nov. 25, 2013),http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/25/us-crowdfundingexpansion-idUSBRE9AO0A620131125 [http://perma.cc/R86D-Q2Q9].
68. Oscar Jofre, North America’s First Simultaneous Cross Border Equity Crowdfunding
Raise: Wafu, CROWDFUND INSIDER (Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2014
/10/51067-north-americas-first-simultaneous-cross-border-equity-crowdfunding-raise-wafu
[http://perma.cc/M7UG-DKNE].
69. See Andrew A. Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1457, 1459–60 (2013).
70. See Ross S. Weinstein, Note, Crowdfunding in the U.S. and Abroad: What to
Expect When You’re Expecting, 46 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 427, 427–28 (2013). The securities
laws apply only to offers, sales, and purchases of securities. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012)
(prohibiting offers and sales of securities without proper registration); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5 (2015) (prohibiting fraud and material misstatements and omissions in connection with a
purchase or sale of securities). Section 2(a)(1) of the 1933 Act includes stock, notes, and
investment contracts within the definition of security. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38,
§ 2(a)(1), 48 Stat. 74, 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012)) (“The term
‘security’ means any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, security-based swap, bond,
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economy and encourage small business, Congress exempted
crowdfunding from certain securities law requirements with the
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (“JOBS Act”).71 In particular,
Title III of the JOBS Act created a securities offering exemption for
“crowdfunding,” which relaxed some of the securities laws’ disclosure
and registration requirements.72 As Tom Hazen points out, “[w]ithout
[this] crowdfunding exemption . . . crowdfunding would not be a
viable capital-raising method in light of the costs of complying with
securities registration or even the more limited disclosure
requirements available under the exemption set forth in SEC
Regulation A.”73
Congress required the Commission to make rules to implement
these new exemptions. Accordingly, in March 2015, the SEC adopted
a final rule, effective on or about June 19, 2015, that amended the
existing Regulation A.74 Now, pursuant to Regulation A+, small
companies can offer and sell up to $50 million (an increase from the
previous $5 million limit) in equity securities without the need to
comply with traditional registration and reporting requirements.75 As
attorneys at the law firm Morgan, Lewis & Bockius succinctly
describe it:
Regulation A+ offerings are unregistered public offerings in
which issuers may conduct general solicitation, including
debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profitsharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, [or] voting-trust certificate . . . .”).
71. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 301–305,
126 Stat. 306, 315–23 (2012) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
72. Id. sec. 302, § 4; see also Schwartz, supra note 69, at 1460–64 (discussing the relaxations
and exemptions); Anna Pinedo, It’s Not Crowdfunding!, MOFO JUMPSTARTER (July 13, 2015),
http://www.mofojumpstarter.com/2015/07/13/its-not-crowdfunding
[http://perma.cc/W8ZQBRVU].
73. Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social Networks and the
Securities Laws—Why the Specially Tailored Exemption Must Be Conditioned on
Meaningful Disclosure, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1735, 1738 (2012).
74. Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities
Act (Regulation A), Securities Act Release No. 9741, Exchange Act Release No. 74,578,
80 Fed. Reg. 21,806 (Apr. 20, 2015). Regulation A is a long-standing exemption allowing
small companies to sell publicly traded equity securities through a truncated registration
and review process and exempting these companies from ongoing reporting requirements.
Small Business Initiatives, 57 Fed. Reg. 36,442, 36,443 (Aug. 13, 1992) (codified as
amended in scattered parts of 17 C.F.R.); Small Business Initiatives, 57 Fed. Reg. 9768,
9770 (proposed Mar. 20, 1992) (codified in scattered parts of 17 C.F.R.).
75. Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities
Act (Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. 21,806; see SEC Adopts Rules to Facilitate Smaller
Companies’ Access to Capital, SEC (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease
/2015-49.html [http://perma.cc/5ZHL-S66V].
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solicitation of non-accredited investors, and the securities
purchased by investors in a Regulation A+ offering are not
“restricted securities” under Rule 144. In addition, the
Regulation A+ offering process is simpler and less costly than a
registered public offering such as an IPO.76
Additionally, in October 2015, the SEC finalized rules to allow
individuals, not just accredited investors, to invest in crowdfunded
securities.77 The practical import of these exemptions is to expand
consumer participation in crowdfunding by giving companies a new—
and more streamlined—route to capital raising in the public market
and by facilitating the trading of their securities in the secondary
markets.78
While seemingly advantageous from a market efficiency and
liquidity perspective, some have expressed concern about these
exemptions from a consumer protection perspective, suggesting that
they have created opportunities for fraud.79 While it is certainly too
soon to tell, some anecdotal evidence so far suggests that these
concerns are well founded. In June 2015, for example, the Federal
Trade Commission (“FTC”) filed the first-ever crowdfunding case,
charging an Oregon man with “unfair or deceptive acts” in raising
$122,000 in a Kickstarter campaign (a popular crowdfunding site).80
He allegedly misled investors to believe that he was funding a board
game project, but instead he used the capital for personal items.81
Reporting on the events and outcome of this case, Kevin Wack of the

76. MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS, SEC ADOPTS FINAL RULES ON REGULATION A+, at
2 (2015), https://www.morganlewis.com/~/media/files/publication/morgan%20lewis%20title
/white%20paper/securitiessecadoptsfinalrulesregulationaapril2015.ashx?la=en [http://perma
.cc/LF44-EH7M].
77. Crowdfunding, Securities Act Release No. 9974, Exchange Act Release No. 76,324,
80 Fed. Reg. 71,388 (Nov. 16, 2015); SEC Adopts Rules to Permit Crowdfunding, SEC (Oct.
30, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-249.html [http://perma.cc/SAE4-XEK4].
78. MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS, supra note 76, at 2; see also Schwartz, supra note
69, at 1459 (noting that the “crowdfunding of securities will help democratize the market
for financing startup companies and small businesses and allow investors of modest means
to make investments that had previously been offered solely to wealthy . . . investors”).
79. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 69, at 1465 & n.46. But see Joan MacLeod
Hemmingway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril: Crowdfunding and the
Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879, 937 (2011) (arguing that notwithstanding
risks of investor fraud, on balance, the positive benefits of a registration exemption
outweigh the possible negative consequences).
80. Complaint at 1–3, FTC v. Chevalier, No. 3:15-cv-01029-AC (D. Or. June 10, 2015);
Angus Loten, Man Settles with FTC over Crowdfunding Case, WALL ST. J. (June 11, 2015),
http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/06/11/man-settles-with-ftc-over-crowdfunding-case/
[http://perma.cc/WS4Y-CMHM (staff-uploaded archive)].
81. See sources cited supra note 80.
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American Banker wrote: “[c]rowdfunding enables fledgling businesses
to tap into a vast online pool of investment dollars, but it also has a
dark side, offering a lucrative new venue for scam artists.”82
This case suggests what others have for several years suspected
to be true: the diffusion of participation in equity offering and
investing, enabled by crowdfunding technology, creates a fertile
ground for abuse. At the same time, as regulators reduce the amount
of disclosure and reporting required in an effort to encourage small
business growth, they further limit their ability to monitor for and
anticipate such misconduct.
B. Whistleblower Programs
The foregoing case study in contemporary financial innovation
illustrated the various constraints on financial regulators’ ability to
supervise the financial services sector comprehensively and, thus,
exposed limits on their capacity to detect putative securities law
violations. In the case of structured finance, the sheer number of
economic actors involved—from the origination and pooling of loans,
to their packaging and the offering of securities comprised of these
fixed-income assets to investors—can muddle information that
regulators receive. More broadly speaking, the shadow banking
system in which this process operates raises significant questions
about the capacity and scope of regulators’ power. Financial
technology, which is also expansive (and sometimes niche), can
likewise strain regulators’ ability to monitor the array of institutions
and markets involved, which evolve quickly and often on a small but
numerous scale.
This Section explores one postcrisis regulatory tool that was
intended to enhance securities law enforcement by leveraging
assistance from private citizens: whistleblower programs.83 It suggests

82. Kevin Wack, P-to-P Regulatory Risks Exposed in Crowdfunding-Fraud Case, AM.
BANKER (June 11, 2015), http://www.americanbanker.com/news/marketplace-lending/p-to-psregulatory-risks-exposed-in-crowdfunding-fraud-case-1074835-1.html [http://perma.cc/PF77VUHL (staff-uploaded archive)].
83. The legislative history suggests that Congress intended for the whistleblower
provisions to “motivate those with inside knowledge to come forward and assist the
Government to identify and prosecute persons who have violated securities laws and
recover money for victims of financial fraud.” SEN. REP. ON FINANCIAL STABILITY, supra
note 6, at 110. In hearings before the House Committee on Financial Services on July 17,
2009, Rep. Paul Kanjorski, Democrat from Pennsylvania, stated: “[W]e ought to put more
cops on the beat by allowing the Commission to pay bounties to whistleblowers whose tips
result in catching fraudsters.” Industry Perspectives on the Obama Administration’s
Financial Regulatory Reform Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.,
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that, in light of the regulatory gaps explored above, whistleblowers
have the potential to improve regulators’ ability to anticipate and
detect financial misconduct.
1. Incentives
Section 922 of the Dodd-Frank Act amended the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), creating section 21F, which
provides incentives for whistleblowers to report violations of the
federal securities laws.84 The program is implemented by the SEC and
serves the “important goals of prevention, timely detection, and
effective enforcement of securities law violations.”85 In broad
overview, it allows the SEC, in its discretion, to make award
payments to “whistleblowers who voluntarily provide[] original
information to the Commission that [leads] to [a] successful
enforcement” action that recovers at least $1 million.86 The SEC
adopted final rules to implement the Dodd-Frank program in May
2011, which rules became effective in August 2011.87
The program is based on incentives, of which there are three.
One is a cash bounty. The program provides that whistleblowers may
be entitled to ten to thirty percent of any sanction collected where the
amount is over $1 million.88 The second incentive is protection from

111th Cong. 2 (2009) (statement of Rep. Paul Kanjorski, Member, H. Comm. on Fin.
Servs.).
84. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, sec. 922, § 21F, 124 Stat. 1376, 1842 (2010)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012)). A whistleblower, under the SEC rules, is anyone
who “provide[s] the Commission with information [that] relates to a possible violation of
the Federal securities laws (including any rules or regulations thereunder) that has
occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(a)(1) (2015).
85. Kathleen L. Casey, Adoption of Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower
Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, SEC (May 25, 2011),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch052511klc-item2.htm
[http://perma.cc/RC5V56CU] [hereinafter Casey Statement].
86. Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 922, § 21F, 124 Stat. at 1841–42.
87. See Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, Exchange Act Release
No. 64,545, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,300 (May 25, 2011) [hereinafter SEC Final Rule
Release]. Although the Dodd-Frank Act set many requirements of the program,
the Commission has exercised its discretion in this rulemaking to propose rules
that contain several key definitional or interpretive provisions that help define the
scope of the program, and procedures that whistleblowers will be required to
follow to submit information to the Commission and to apply for awards under the
Program . . . .
Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 63,237, 75 Fed. Reg. 70,488,
70,514–15 (proposed Nov. 3, 2010) [hereinafter Proposed Whistleblower Rule].
88. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.21F-3(a)(4), 240.21F-5(b).
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workplace retaliation.89 Recently, the SEC has made clear that it
intends to vigorously pursue employers that retaliate. As evidence of
this, in April 2015, the Commission announced an award in
connection with its first ever retaliation case.90 There, a whistleblower
received over $600,000 for information regarding undisclosed trading
activity in violation of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.91 But the
SEC also charged the company, Paradigm Capital Management, with
retaliating against the whistleblower by removing him from his
position, requiring him to investigate the misconduct he had reported,
altering his job duties, and generally “marginalizing [him].”92 The
third incentive is confidentiality; a whistleblower’s identity will not be
disclosed to the public, absent limited exceptions.93 A whistleblower
can also submit information anonymously through an attorney.94
The number of tips has grown in each year of the program’s
existence. In fiscal year 2015, the SEC Office of the Whistleblower95
received nearly 4,000 tips—a slight increase from the 3,620 tips in
2014 and 3,238 in 2013; and a more pronounced increase from the
3,001 tips in 2012 and 334 tips in 2011.96 Most commonly, the SEC
receives information pertaining to corporate disclosures and
financials, followed by securities offering fraud and securities
89. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b). The anti-retaliation
provisions of the Dodd-Frank whistleblower program expanded on the whistleblower
program put in place by section 806 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which was also
passed in response to corporate fraud. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107204, sec. 806, § 1514A, 116 Stat. 745, 802–04 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A
(2012)).
90. Paradigm Capital Mgmt., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 74,826, 2015 WL
1907622 (Apr. 28, 2015); see Paradigm Capital Mgmt., Inc., Exchange Act Release No.
72,393, 2014 WL 2704311 (June 16, 2014).
91. See sources cited supra note 90; see also SEC Announces Award to Whistleblower
in First Retaliation Case, SEC (Apr. 28, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/201575.html [http://perma.cc/W7MP-KHBD].
92. SEC Announces Award to Whistleblower in First Retaliation Case, supra note 91;
see Alexandra Stevenson, S.E.C. Fines Hedge Fund in Demotion of Whistle-Blowing
Employee, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2014, 8:37 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/06/16
/s-e-c-fines-firm-over-whistle-blower-retaliation/?_php=true&_type=blogs&module
=BlogPost-Title&version=Blog%20Main&contentCollection=Legal/Regulatory&action
=Click&pgtype=Blogs&region=Body&_r=1 [http://perma.cc/WL4N-EWMS] (identifying
the whistleblower as former head trader James Nordgaard).
93. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-7(a) (2015).
94. Id.
95. Office of the Whistleblower, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/whistleblower [http://perma.cc
/FDJ3-L52W].
96. SEC, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE DODD-FRANK
WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 21 (2015) [hereinafter 2015 WHISTLEBLOWER REPORT],
https://www.sec.gov/whistleblower/reportspubs/annual-reports/owb-annual-report-2015.pdf
[http://perma.cc/7PZD-CS8E].
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manipulation.97 For example, according to the SEC’s most recent
annual report to Congress, several awards were made in connection
with misconduct in the financial services industry, involving “Ponzilike schemes” and “false or misleading statements” in offering
memoranda, marketing materials, or price information.98 So far, the
SEC has made twenty-two awards in connection with sixteen different
matters.99
2. Expansion
Regulators have been pushing to strengthen and expand the
program over the past several years. Domestically, the SEC has made
clear its commitment to the program by pressing the private market
to cooperate. Not only has the SEC expressed its commitment to
pursuing retaliation suits,100 but it has also punished companies for
chilling whistleblowing in other ways. In that vein, employment
contracts have been a focus. In April 2015, the SEC announced a
settlement with KBR Inc. (a Houston-based engineering and
construction company) regarding language in that company’s
confidentiality agreements that “undermine[d] the purpose of Section
21F and Rule 21F-17(a).”101 The SEC found that the language in the
agreements, which prohibited employees from discussing internal
investigations with outside parties—including, presumably, the
government—violated Exchange Act Rule 21F-17(a): that “[n]o
person may take any action to impede an individual from
communicating directly with the Commission staff about a possible
securities law violation, including enforcing, or threatening to enforce,
a
confidentiality
agreement . . . with
respect
to
such
communications.”102
The SEC has also been pressing for a more expansive definition
of “whistleblowers” through amicus briefs in federal court.103 In the
SEC’s view, where the statute’s antiretaliation provisions are
concerned, the definition of whistleblower includes those who report
internally, to the firm, as well as those who report to the

97. Id. at 22.
98. Id. at 17.
99. Id. at 12, 16.
100. See supra notes 89–92 and accompanying text.
101. KBR, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 74,619, 2015 WL 1456619 (Apr. 1, 2015).
102. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-17(a) (2015).
103. See, e.g., Brief of the Sec. & Exch. Comm’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of the
Appellant, Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, No. 14-4626 (2d Cir. Feb. 6, 2015), https://www
.sec.gov/litigation/briefs/2015/daniel-berman-020615.pdf [http://perma.cc/2YT4-87VC].
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Commission.104 Finally, there has been some suggestion that the
Department of Justice would like to extend whistleblower programs
in the financial crime arena as well.105
Whistleblower programs are also expanding abroad. On the
domestic end, the SEC has been clear that it welcomes information
from citizens living or residing abroad. Since the program’s beginning,
it has received tips from over ninety-five different countries and has
made awards in three different matters where the whistleblower lived
abroad.106 In the Commission’s view, the program has a “global
scope.”107
The European Union has also shown some commitment to
augmenting whistleblower programs. A 2014 EU Regulation on
Market Abuse required that all European Union member states
implement a whistleblower program in their respective jurisdictions
by 2016 (with respect to violations of the market abuse directive).108
The United Kingdom also recently strengthened its stance on
whistleblowers. Its existing whistleblower statute, the Public Interest
Disclosure Act of 1998 (“PIDA”), “protect[s] individuals who make
certain disclosures of information in the public interest.”109
Specifically, PIDA protects individuals who make “qualifying
disclosures” to their employer or another person or government
entity that is responsible for the issues being disclosed.110 This
104. See Interpretation of the SEC’s Whistleblower Rules Under Section 21F of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 75,592, 2015 WL 4624264
(Aug. 4, 2015).
105. Barrett, supra note 15.
106. 2015 WHISTLEBLOWER REPORT, supra note 96, at 12, 24.
107. Id. at 12.
108. Council Regulation 596/2014, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 1, 14 ¶ 74, 16, 33 (EU).
109. Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998, c. 23 (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.uk
/ukpga/1998/23 [http://perma.cc/VHY9-P7N9]; see David Lewis, A.J. Brown & Richard
Moberly, Whistleblowing, Its Importance and the State of Research, in INTERNATIONAL
HANDBOOK ON WHISTLEBLOWING RESEARCH 1, 359 (A.J. Brown et al. eds., 2014)
[hereinafter WHISTLEBLOWING HANDBOOK].
110. Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998, c. 23, § 1 (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.uk
/ukpga/1998/23 [http://perma.cc/VHY9-P7N9]. A protected qualifying disclosure is one
that an employee reasonably believes in good faith is in the public interest and that
tends to show one or more of the following: (a) that a criminal offence has been
committed, is being committed or is likely to be committed, (b) that a person has
failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation . . . , (c) that a
miscarriage of justice has occurred, is occurring or is likely to occur, (d) that the
health or safety of any individual has been, is being or is likely to be endangered,
(e) that the environment has been, is being or is likely to be damaged, or (f) that
information tending to show any matter falling within any one of the preceding
paragraphs has been, is being or is likely to be deliberately concealed.
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includes, for example, disclosures made to the United Kingdom’s
Serious Fraud Office regarding instances of past or ongoing economic
crimes.111
In the financial services context specifically, England’s prudential
bank regulators, the Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”) and the
Bank of England Prudential Regulation Authority, have noted that
whistleblowers “play an important role in helping to protect the
safety and soundness of firms.”112 And in the summer of 2015, the
FCA announced new rules for deposit-takers, certain investment
firms, and insurers regarding internal whistleblower mechanisms.113 In
contrast to the U.S.-SEC model, however, the new U.K. rules do not
incentivize or impose a duty on employees to report “concerns” to
regulators.114 Rather, the rules require financial firms to go beyond
what is required by PIDA, to implement procedures for handling a
wider range of “reportable concerns.”115
***
This Part has sought to frame the debate about whistleblower
programs in terms of current and anticipated challenges that
innovation in the current global economic environment poses for
financial regulation and enforcement. It first provided some context
for why private assistance is necessary to aid public enforcement at
all—because innovation, and the complexity and diffusion it brings,
has and will likely continue to overwhelm regulatory resources and
create fertile environments for misconduct.116 Then, this Part
Id.
111. SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE, GUIDELINES ON MAKING A PUBLIC INTEREST
DISCLOSURE, 2013, at 4 (UK), https://www.sfo.gov.uk/media/34779/Guidelines_on_making
_a_public_interest_disclosure.pdf [http://perma.cc/65FQ-KTEJ].
112. BANK OF ENGLAND PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AUTHORITY & FINANCIAL
CONDUCT AUTHORITY, FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FOR WHISTLEBLOWERS, 2014, ¶ 1,
https://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/financial-incentives-for-whistleblowers.pdf
[http://perma.cc/6SAA-QWRM].
113. Whistleblowing in Deposit-Takers, PRA-Designated Investment Firms and
Insurers 2015, PS 15/24, ¶¶ 1.1, 1.7 (UK); FCA Introduces New Rules on Whistleblowing,
FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. (June, 10, 2015), https://www.fca.org.uk/news/fca-introduces-newrules-on-whistleblowing [http://perma.cc/SCX7-E3LY].
114. Whistleblowing in Deposit-Takers, PRA-Designated Investment Firms and
Insurers 2015, PS 15/24, ¶¶ 1.15, 2.24, 2.27.
115. See Accountability and Whistleblowing Instrument 2015, FCA 2015/46, Annex
A(1) (defining a “reportable concern” as “(a) anything that would be the subject-matter of
a protected disclosure, including breaches of rules; (b) a breach of the firm’s policies and
procedures; and (c) behavior that harms or is likely to harm the reputation or financial
well-being of the firm”).
116. Awrey has also noted several ways in which innovation (and complexity)
contribute to regulatory asymmetries. He argues: “Complexity and innovation have
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surveyed one attempted solution: whistleblower programs, both in the
United States, under the aegis of the SEC, and abroad, with fledging
expansion in the European Union and United Kingdom. Drawing on
this framework, which casts whistleblower programs as desirable
(indeed, necessary), the balance of this Article aims to strengthen the
integrity and quality of postcrisis whistleblower programs by
reexamining their benefits and costs in light of the contemporary
marketplace.
II. A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF WHISTLEBLOWERS
Part I highlighted three areas of the global financial markets in
which regulatory asymmetries—informational and expertise gaps
between regulators and the private market—frustrate regulatory
supervision and give rise to opportunity for misconduct. This Part
evaluates whistleblower solutions from a cost-benefit perspective.
Section II.A first provides some theoretical framework for a costbenefit analysis of whistleblower programs, and the SEC
whistleblower program in particular. Section II.B then engages in a
conceptual analysis of the various benefits of the whistleblower
program, both observable and hypothetical. Section II.C then sets out
the costs and unintended consequences of a strong, highly
incentivized whistleblower program. Ultimately, Part II argues that
the strong U.S. model is, on balance, desirable when one weighs the
benefits of whistleblower laws against their costs.
A. Framing the Analysis
Strictly speaking, independent agencies, like the Commission, are
not required to engage in cost-benefit analysis—although historically
(since the 1980s), the Commission has voluntarily done so as a matter
of “good regulatory practice.”117 Yet this practice was altered slightly
combined to generate significant asymmetries of information and expertise within
financial markets, thereby . . . exacerbating already pervasive agency cost problems. At the
same time, the pace of innovation has left financial regulators and regulation chronically
behind the curve.” Awrey, supra note 17, at 238–39.
117. Mary L. Schapiro, Testimony Concerning Economic Analysis in SEC Rulemaking:
Before the Subcommittee on TARP, Financial Services and Bailouts of Public and Private
Programs Oversight and Government Reform Committee U.S. House of Representatives, SEC
(Apr.
17,
2012), http://www.sec.gov/News/Testimony/Detail/Testimony/1365171489400
[http://perma.cc/74EM-J4P7] [hereinafter SEC Rulemaking Testimony] (“When the
Commission engages in rulemaking, it strives to adopt rules that further that mission
without imposing unjustified costs. Understanding the potential economic consequences of
rules the Commission is considering is an integral component of that process.”). There are
two provisions, however, that require the SEC to consider the likely impact of its rules.
One provides that the SEC “shall not adopt any rule or regulation which would impose a
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after the crisis. Given the significant rulemaking burden that the
Dodd-Frank Act imposed,118 the Commission adopted the position
that little cost-benefit analysis (if any at all) was necessary in areas
where Congress had left the Commission no discretion.119 So, for
example, when section 939B of the Dodd-Frank Act required the
Commission to “revise Regulation FD . . . to remove from such
regulation the exemption for entities whose primary business is the
issuance of credit ratings[,]”120 the Commission did not include a costbenefit analysis on the ground that “any costs and benefits to the
economy resulting from the amendments are mandated by the [DoddFrank] Act.”121
Likewise, in connection with the final whistleblower rule, the
Commission engaged in a cost-benefit analysis only with respect to
those elements of the program where the SEC planned to exercise its
discretion122: (1) in defining the terms “Voluntary Submission of
Information,” “Independent Knowledge,” and “Information that
Leads to Successful Enforcement”; (2) an additional (i.e., nonstatutory) factor used to determine the amount of the award paid to a
whistleblower;123 (3) a few additional criteria for award eligibility,

burden on competition not necessary or appropriate” to advance the purposes of the
securities laws. 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(2) (2012). The other requires the SEC, when it “is
engaged in rulemaking,” to “consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether
the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.” 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f)
(2012).
118. Implementing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, SEC,
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank.shtml (last modified Aug. 6, 2015) [http://perma.cc
/2JPD-DL4F].
119. SEC Rulemaking Testimony, supra note 117. In 2014, the D.C. Circuit effectively
conceded in the conflict minerals case that where Congress mandates a rule that is not
based on investor protection—and did not do cost-benefit analysis—the Commission may
not be required to do cost-benefit analysis. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359,
369 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
120. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 939B, 124 Stat. 1376, 1887–88 (2010).
121. Removal from Regulation FD of the Exemption for Credit Rating Agencies,
Securities Act Release No. 9146, Exchange Act Release No. 63,003, Investment Company
Act Release No. 29,448, 75 Fed. Reg. 61,050, 61,051 (Oct. 4, 2010).
122. Regarding this final rule, Commissioner Casey stated that
[t]he Commission has taken the view that it is only required to analyze costs and
benefits flowing from the Commission’s exercise of its discretionary authority.
This approach is too narrow and improperly limits the scope and regulatory value
of cost-benefit analysis. In the context of the current rule, this approach has led us
to drastically underestimate the costs of the whistleblower program.
Casey Statement, supra note 85.
123. Proposed Whistleblower Rule, supra note 87, at 70,515. This additional factor is
“whether the award otherwise enhances the Commission’s ability to enforce the Federal
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namely, certain types of cooperation and the exclusion from eligibility
of anyone who was a “member, officer, or employee” of a foreign
government at the time information was acquired; (4) specifications
regarding the procedures required to submit information and claim an
award; (5) the exclusion from the $1 million threshold of any
sanctions that the whistleblower is required to pay; and (6) authority
for the Commission to communicate directly with “[any]
whistleblower who is a director, officer, member, agent, or employee
of an entity that has counsel [and] has initiated communications with
the Commission.”124
The result was a little over five pages of cost-benefit analysis in
the proposed rule.125 Therein, the crux of the Commission’s analysis
focused on the rule’s benefits, citing the “strong incentives” that the
proposed definitions created for whistleblowers “to provide
information early, rather than waiting to receive a request or inquiry
from a relevant authority.”126 As an additional benefit, the
Commission believed that its definitions were well tailored to reduce
the incidence of low-quality tips by, for example, requiring
information that “significantly contributed to the success of an
[enforcement] action” or “would not otherwise have been obtained
and was essential to the success of the action.”127 As for the costs, for
the most part the Commission limited its analysis to potential costs
the rule would impose on whistleblowers, with much less
consideration for the costs that might arise in the financial services
industry or society more broadly.128
Since that analysis was performed, however, regulators and
scholars have continued to debate the appropriate model of costbenefit analysis in financial regulation. In general, the trend has
favored more robust analysis before new rules are imposed.129
Congress, for example, has introduced bills that would give the
securities laws, protect investors, and encourage the submission of high quality
information from whistleblowers.” Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 70,514–18.
126. Id. at 70,516.
127. Id. Notably, however, the final rule loosened this standard, requiring only
“original information . . . [t]hat leads to successful enforcement.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-3(a)
(2015).
128. See Proposed Whistleblower Rule, supra note 87, at 70,517–18.
129. As Professor John Coates has written, a recent “movement is afoot to impose
cost-benefit analysis (CBA) on financial regulation (CBA/FR).” John C. Coates IV, CostBenefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882,
885 (2015) (noting that the substantial reforms imposed by Dodd-Frank “reignited
criticism for failure to base the changes on adequate CBA/FR”).
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president authority to require independent agencies to conduct costbenefit analysis of their financial regulation.130 And although the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the Commission is not
required “to measure the immeasurable,”131 it arguably should still
“determine as best it can the economic implications of [a] rule.”132
Indeed, the Commission itself has since changed its position; now,
“[t]he new guidance . . . states that as a policy matter, where a statute
directs rulemaking, rulewriting staff should consider the overall
economic impacts, including both those attributable to Congressional
mandates and those that result from an exercise of the Commission’s
discretion.”133 In perhaps another paradigm shift, academics have
begun defending the virtues of conceptual—over strictly
quantitative—cost-benefit analysis. Scholars like Professor John
Coates and Professor David Zaring, while resisting “efforts to impose
judicially reviewed, quantified, [cost-benefit analysis] on independent
financial agencies,” have urged the importance of conceptual costbenefit analysis, which “could lead to better policy and . . . advance
the substantive project of quantitative [cost-benefit analysis] itself.”134
At this juncture in the evolution of the cost-benefit analysis of
financial regulation, academics and policy makers alike should be
interested in revisiting the costs and benefits of the whistleblower
program. It also seems productive to do so, given that the contours,
boundaries, definitions, and trajectory of whistleblower programs
globally remain in flux. Accordingly, the balance of this Part aims to
130. Independent Agency Regulatory Analysis Act of 2013, S. 1173, 113th Cong.
§ 3(a)(6); Independent Agency Regulatory Analysis Act of 2012, S. 3468, 112th Cong.
§ 3(a)(6).
131. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 552 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Inv. Co.
Inst. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 720 F.3d 370, 379 (D.C. Cir. 2013)).
132. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2005). However, as
David Zaring points out,
The court’s interest in cost-benefit analysis might be said to have two degrees in
intensity. The first, a requirement that the S.E.C. do one, and do it carefully,
appears to have been internalized by the agency. A second, more intensive, costbenefit analysis would require a quantification of the costs and benefits. That
component has never been definitively imposed on the agency by the circuit court,
and the S.E.C. appears to be willing to propose rules that lack this sort of
quantitative justification.
David Zaring, The State of Cost-Benefit Analysis at the S.E.C., N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/14/business/dealbook/the-state-of-cost-benefit-analysis-at
-the-sec.html [http://perma.cc/5S64-YE49 (dark archive)].
133. SEC Rulemaking Testimony, supra note 117.
134. Coates, supra note 129, at 886; see Zaring, supra note 132 (explaining that “[i]f we
must have costs and benefits, perhaps it is good that the S.E.C. is trying to preserve
flexibility about how it defines them”).
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update the Commission’s initial cost-benefit analysis, so that scholars
and regulators can reflect on how to move forward. To be sure, with
the benefit of four years of hindsight and data, the nature of this post
hoc cost-benefit analysis will be quite distinct from that which is
ordinarily performed before a rule becomes final. Nonetheless, given
the extent to which regulators worldwide are prepared to embrace
and expand whistleblower programs, it is worthwhile to engage in a
reanalysis of their costs and benefits, drawing on the United States’
recent experience.135
B.

Whistleblowing and Its Benefits

In the financial regulation context, whistleblowing programs
have several conceptual and observable benefits. To begin, as the
Commission’s experience suggests, one (arguably principal) benefit of
a whistleblower program is that it can be effective in assisting the
government to detect financial misconduct. There are other, perhaps
less appreciated, benefits to whistleblowing programs as well,
including a more efficient use of government resources, enhanced
market discipline, and improved industry ethics, which can enhance
the legitimacy of the industry and, along with it, consumer confidence.
1. Regulatory Gaps
In theory, whistleblowers programs are designed to aid the
government in filling regulatory gaps. Whistleblowers—who are most
often individuals within the financial industry136—have the knowledge
and expertise that government regulators often lack, but which is
135. Consistent with Professors Coates’s and Zaring’s view, Sections II.B and II.C
likewise engage in a principally conceptual cost-benefit analysis. See also U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE,
GAO-12-151,
DODD-FRANK
REGULATIONS:
IMPLEMENTATION COULD BENEFIT FROM ADDITIONAL ANALYSES AND
COORDINATION 19 (2011); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-032,
FINANCIAL REGULATION: INDUSTRY TRENDS CONTINUE TO CHALLENGE THE
FEDERAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE 3, 13 (2007) (“Measuring regulatory benefits
remains [a] challenge largely because of the difficulty in quantifying benefits such as
improved consumer protection or financial stability [in the context of financial services
regulation.] . . . While regulation provides a broad assurance of the strength of financial
markets, it is difficult to measure those benefits, in part because regulations seeking to
ensure financial stability aim to prevent low-probability, high-cost events.”); Coates, supra
note 129, at 894–95 (noting that “full quantification in CBA/FR is likely to be difficult
because finance is at the heart of the economy, involves groups of people (firms, markets)
interacting in complex, difficult-to-study ways, and is shaped by forces that change rapidly
over time”).
136. See 2015 WHISTLEBLOWER REPORT, supra note 96, at 16 (“[T]o date, almost half
of the award recipients were current or former employees of the company on which they
reported information of wrongdoing.”).
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necessary to detect many cases of financial misconduct.137 Precisely as
Professor Saule Omarova has argued, “[p]rivate industry actors may
be in the best position to identify and understand underlying trends in
the increasingly complex financial markets and to gather and analyze,
in real time, information most relevant to systemic risk
management.”138 With four years of data to draw on, it appears that,
in practice, whistleblowers are effective at detecting misconduct.139 In
sixteen different matters,140 whistleblowers have provided government
regulators with inside information about past or ongoing misconduct,
thereby overcoming the government’s traditional resource limitations.
Whistleblowers can help regulators overcome their resource gaps
in two distinct ways. First, whistleblowers play an early-warning role.
Recent examples are instructive. In the fall of 2014, the SEC paid a
$30 million award—its largest yet—to a foreign tipster for
information about an ongoing fraud that, as the SEC described,
would have been difficult to detect without the whistleblower’s
help.141 Considering that whistleblower awards are calculated at ten to
thirty percent of the total recovery, the fraud that whistleblower
disclosed had presumably already caused losses or damage between
$100 and $300 million. Since the fraud was “ongoing,”142 one can
assume that those losses would have increased without the
whistleblower’s information.
In 2015, the financial markets were again presumably spared
from significant harm when a firm employee disclosed to the SEC
that Bank of America’s (“BOA”) London-based affiliate was
involved in extensive “dividend arbitrage” in the context of
international tax laws.143 It made several whistleblowing submissions
137. See supra Section I.A (discussing areas of innovative financial activity where
regulatory gaps exists).
138. Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry
Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 418 (2011).
139. Full details of whistleblower cases are difficult to know because the government
usually promises confidentiality in exchange for the information. However, it is possible to
parse some critical facts from media reports and SEC press releases and annual reports to
Congress. See, e.g., Paradigm Capital Mgmt., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 74,826, 2015
WL 1907622 (Apr. 28, 2015) (awarding over $600,000 to head trader who had been
demoted after providing information to SEC).
140. See 2015 WHISTLEBLOWER REPORT, supra note 96, at 16.
141. Rachel Louise Ensign, SEC to Pay $30 Million Whistleblower Award, Its Largest Yet,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 22, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-to-pay-30-million-whistlebloweraward-its-largest-yet-1411406612# [http://perma.cc/LF3W-Z5RW (staff-uploaded archive)].
142. Id.
143. Jenny Strasburg, Bank of America’s U.S. Deposit-Taking Unit Financed Tax Trades,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/bank-of-americas-u-s-deposit-taking
-unit-financed-tax-trades-1423666493 [http://perma.cc/L8LY-QZ42 (staff-uploaded archive)].
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about BOA’s “ ‘increasingly aggressive and reckless’ tax-avoidance
trades,” which put the bank at risk of “serious financial and
reputational damage.”144 Also in 2015, the SEC announced that
another payment would be made, of about $1.5 million,145 to a
compliance officer “who had a reasonable basis to believe that
disclosure to the SEC was necessary to prevent imminent misconduct
from causing substantial financial harm to the company or
investors.”146 The language of the SEC disclosure, though necessarily
vague, suggests that losses were averted thanks to the whistleblower
submission. Based on these few examples, it appears that in
performing this early-warning function, whistleblowers have played a
part in mitigating potential market losses by muting the impact of
nascent misconduct.147
Second, data also suggest that whistleblowers may provide some
deterrent value by increasing the chances (and possibly speed with
which) misconduct is detected. The case of the “flash crash” of 2010—
in which the Dow Jones suddenly dropped by one thousand points—
is particularly telling.148 For five years, regulators had thought that the
crash was caused by the innocuous trades of a mainstream trading
house, made at a time of macroeconomic unease.149 In 2015, however,
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the Department of
Justice filed charges against a London-based trader, alleging that the
crash was caused by his manipulative “spoofing” of a certain stock
index.150 Apparently, that information was learned from a

144. Id.
145. Order Determining Whistleblower Award Claim, Exchange Act Release No.
74,781, 2015 WL 1814377 (Apr. 22, 2015).
146. SEC Announces Million-Dollar Whistleblower Award to Compliance Officer, SEC
(Apr. 22, 2015) (emphasis added), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-73.html
[http://perma.cc/88XV-K578].
147. See supra Part I.
148. Aruna Viswanatha, Bradley Hope & Jenny Strasburg, ‘Flash Crash’ Charges Filed,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 21, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-k-man-arrested-on-charges-tiedto-may-2010-flash-crash-1429636758 [http://perma.cc/7R3X-AMJB (staff-uploaded archive)].
149. Id.
150. See Civil Complaint at 2, 20, 21, Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n v. Nav Sarao
Futures Ltd., No. 1:15-cv-03398 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 2015), http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public
/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfsaraocomplaint041715.pdf [http://perma
.cc/8Q7A-3PVF]; Criminal Complaint at 1, 3, United States v. Singh Sarao, No. 1:15-cr-00075
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases
/attachments/2015/04/21/sarao_criminal_complaint.pdf [http://perma.cc/7PQA-WYDG];
Dave Michaels, Matthew Leising & Sam Mamudi, Flash Crash Arrest Lays Bare Regulatory
Lapses at All Levels, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles
/2015-04-22/flash-crash-arrest-lays-bare-regulatory-lapses-at-all-levels [http://perma.cc/Y2K4FZED].
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whistleblower’s submission, but was unknown to regulators for these
past five years.151
Consistent with this anecdotal evidence, empirical evidence
further suggests that whistleblowers are generally better at
uncovering fraud than government supervisory authorities acting
alone. Congress has reported that in the past four years
whistleblowers have uncovered 54.1% of frauds in public companies,
versus the 4.1% detected by the SEC and external auditors.152 In
theory, then, robust whistleblower programs that effectively attract
insider information should disincentivize would-be perpetrators of
misconduct, assuming that such actors recognize the increased risks of
detection and punishment associated with misconduct.
2. Regulatory Efficiency
There are a number of economic reasons why governments rely
on the private sector to provide public services. One standard
rationale for privatization or outside contracting is that private-sector
actors will perform the jobs for which they are hired with greater
efficiency than their government counterparts, whose government
salaries and career security fail to provide the same motivating
incentives. Relatedly, competitive pressures in the private sector
should force private actors to perform with better quality and at lower
cost than a government service provider would. In short, whereas
government service providers have no reason to perform a job as
efficiently as possible because the workflow is guaranteed, privatesector actors vie for government contracts and must therefore
outperform the competition.153

151. See Viswanatha et al., supra note 148.
152. SEN. REP. ON FINANCIAL STABILITY, supra note 6, at 110. On the punishment
side, research has found that whistleblower involvement in a government investigation has
resulted in higher sanctions, in the form of increased firm or individual fines, and greater
prison sentences. Andrew C. Call et al., The Impact of Whistleblowers on Financial
Misrepresentation Enforcement Actions 4–5 (Dec. 9, 2014) (unpublished manuscript),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2506418
[http://perma.cc/TC26-HAHV].
“The results of this analysis suggest whistleblower involvement in enforcement actions
accounts for 27.5% of total penalties assessed in all enforcement actions from 1978–2012
and increase[d] the length of prison sentences for culpable employees by more than
[twenty-five] months . . . .” Id. at 6. The prospect of more severe penalties could also be
expected to have some deterrent effect.
153. See generally William L. Megginson & Jeffry M. Netter, From State to Market: A
Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization, 39 J. ECON. LITERATURE 321, 321 (2001)
(documenting and summarizing empirical findings on the benefits of privatization). But see
Molly Ball, The Privatization Backlash, ATLANTIC (Apr. 23, 2014), http://www.theatlantic
.com/politics/archive/2014/04/city-state-governments-privatization-contracting-backlash
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On these rationales, state, local, and federal governments have
increasingly relied on the private sector to perform some of its core
responsibilities.154 During and after the Reagan Administration, the
executive branch took the view that the American bureaucracy had
become “inefficient and bloated” in past decades and that a
downsized
government
supplemented
with
public-private
partnerships would be more productive and cost effective.155 In many
ways, this philosophy of utilizing the private sector for public services
transformed the regulatory machinery of the United States. Today,
many state and local governments lease toll roads, bridges, and
tunnels to private contractors—as well as a range of other services,
including utilities, corrections, education, and medical services.156
Similar efficiency theories motivated early corporate
whistleblower programs as well. Although initially resisted as
“panoptic,” “whistleblowing as a source of information” about
wrongdoing within the firm ultimately found its “legitimacy as
countering organizational inefficiency.”157 Relying, in part, on
information from whistleblowers actually allowed firms to reduce
employee regulation, on the ground that whistleblowers could play a
cost-saving deterrence function.158
Outsourcing financial supervision (in part) to private citizens can
yield several economic gains in the securities law context as well. For
one, it accomplishes more comprehensive monitoring at lower
taxpayer cost. To prophylactically monitor all financial activity—
particularly that which is innovative and diffuse—would be
extraordinarily costly for the state to accomplish.159 The federal
/361016/ [http://perma.cc/L97K-BP2A] (noting that in recent years, “the public impression of
privatization as a panacea for the inherent inefficiency of government has been tarnished”).
154. See Paul R. Verkuil, Public Law Limitations on Privatization of Government
Functions, 84 N.C. L. REV. 397, 399 (2006) (citing PAUL C. LIGHT, THE TRUE SIZE OF
GOVERNMENT 1–3 (1999)).
155. Id. at 417–18; see John B. Goodman & Gary W. Loveman, Does Privatization
Serve the Public Interest?, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov–Dec. 1991, at 26, 26; Paul R. Verkuil,
Reverse Yardstick Competition: A New Deal for the Nineties, 45 FLA. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1993).
156. COMM’N ON GOV’T FORECASTING & ACCOUNTABILITY, STATE OF ILL.,
GOVERNMENT PRIVATIZATION: HISTORY, EXAMPLES, AND ISSUES 9–19 (2006).
157. See WIM VANDEKERCKHOVE, WHISTLEBLOWING AND ORGANIZATIONAL
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: A GLOBAL ASSESSMENT 139 (2006).
158. See id.
159. See In re Nat’l Presto Indus., Inc., 347 F.3d 662, 664 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Federal
agencies have limited resources, and the SEC in particular is often outgunned by the
affluent defendants that it sues.”); In re SmithKline Beckman Corp. Sec. Litig., 751 F.
Supp. 525, 535 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (“Private litigation aids effective enforcement of the
securities laws because private plaintiffs prosecute violations that might otherwise go
undetected due to the SEC’s limited resources.” (quoting Note, Private Causes of Action
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government would have to employ hundreds of public-sector
employees simply to learn the mechanics of new financial products,
not to mention to keep enough eyes on the ground. Where global
institutions and markets are concerned, there are additional
transaction costs (both economic and political) involved with
allocating monitoring responsibility between sovereigns. Yet private
individuals who are industry insiders are already placed (and trained)
to perform these kinds of monitoring tasks; whistleblower programs
incentivize them to do so, for only a relatively small portion of
enforcement damages collected.160
Furthermore, whistleblower programs may create secondary
efficiency gains. For one, to the extent regulators can rely on
whistleblowers as early-warning systems, they can then also rely less
heavily on other forms of top-down regulation that may be more
costly for firms.161 Moreover, firms may realize efficiency gains to the
extent that whistleblower programs make the industry safer and more
stable. Misconduct in one institution often imposes significant costs
on others, by damaging consumer confidence in finance or inviting
more (and more costly) regulatory scrutiny and regulation to the
industry as a whole.162 Accordingly, if whistleblower programs are
successful in reducing misconduct in the industry writ large,
eventually firm-level regulatory and legal costs may decrease.
Finally, whistleblower programs may serve public welfare goals.
Public choice theory generally posits that government regulation can
become dysfunctional when regulators are beholden to private
interests.163 This phenomenon, known as “capture,” bears out “the
idea that powerful organizations with private interests may capture

for Investors Under SEC Rule 10b-5; A Policy, Doctrinal, and Economic Analysis, 100
HARV. L. REV. 1959, 1963 n.24 (1987))).
160. Whistleblowers are compensated through an Investor Protection Fund,
established by Congress, which is funded by sanctions collected by the SEC. See 2015
WHISTLEBLOWER REPORT, supra note 96, at 27.
161. See Skinner, supra note 6, at 1588–1610 (discussing the economic merits of
relaxing quantitative forms of regulation, like capital ratios, in exchange for qualitative,
misconduct-oriented supervisory regulation).
162. See id. (discussing the social and economic costs of misconduct).
163. See Lawrence G. Baxter, “Capture” in Financial Regulation: Can We Channel It
Toward the Common Good?, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 175, 175–76 (2011). See
generally JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND
WHY THEY DO IT 76 (1989) (discussing “client politics” and the accompanying agency
capture problem “when most or all of the benefits of a program go to some single,
reasonably small interest (an industry, profession, or locality) but most or all of the costs
will be borne by a large number of people (for example, all taxpayers)”).
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the government in order to foster their private goals.”164 Regulatory
capture thus results when certain influential members of an industry
are able to persuade state regulators to use the power of the state to
establish or enforce rules at the public’s expense—by doing so,
industry’s “influence” is “disproportionate to the balance of interests
envisaged when the regulatory system was established.”165
Some scholars have argued that finance is particularly susceptible
to capture.166 It is a “highly complex field, mastered only by a small
class of people.”167 And this class of elite, specialized professionals is
incentivized “to construct interests and preferences in a way that
favours laissez-faire regulation.”168 In this vein, the public has
criticized the SEC and the Department of Justice for failing to punish
financial actors for the causes of the financial crisis.169 Though existing
accounts of capture theory do not definitively explain why this
phenomenon occurs, resource limitations are, at least in part, to
blame; where the regulator depends on the regulated in the industry
for critical information—to understand how the industry works—the
resulting rules may favor the industry’s special interests.170

164. Frédéric Boehm, Regulatory Capture Revisited—Lessons from Economics of
Corruption 4 (July 2007) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.icgg.org/downloads
/Boehm%20-%20Regulatory%20Capture%20Revisited.pdf [http://perma.cc/2L4J-3K3C].
165. Baxter, supra note 163, at 176–78.
166. See CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RULE
MAKING IN THE 21ST CENTURY 19, 177–78, 185 (2012); see also Kevin L. Young,
Transnational Regulatory Capture? An Empirical Examination of the Transnational
Lobbying of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 19 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 663,
664 (2012).
167. Douglas Sarro, Rational Choices, but for Whom? Transnational Financial
Regulation After the Crisis, 2 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 455, 460 (2011) (reviewing
BRUMMER, supra note 166).
168. Id.
169. See, e.g., Jesse Eisinger, Why Only One Top Banker Went to Jail for the Financial
Crisis, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/04/magazine/onlyone-top-banker-jail-financial-crisis.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/PXA9-ZA6M (dark archive)];
Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?,
N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/01/09/financial-crisiswhy-no-executive-prosecutions [http://perma.cc/VJ7H-FR7T]; Andrew Ross Sorkin, Realities
Behind Prosecuting Big Banks, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com
/2013/03/11/big-banks-go-wrong-but-pay-a-little-price/?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/7G3C-CZ6S];
Matt Taibbi, Why Isn’t Wall Street in Jail?, ROLLING STONE (Feb. 16, 2011),
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/why-isnt-wall-street-in-jail-20110216
[http://perma.cc/TLH6-8HJ8].
170. See Ernesto Dal Bó, Regulatory Capture: A Review, 22 OXFORD REV. ECON.
POL’Y 203, 203–04, 207, 210 (2006) (focusing in particular on Stigler’s principal-agent
model, which emphasizes the asymmetric flow of information and influence between the
regulator and regulated).
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Whistleblower programs, however, may mitigate the costs
associated with capture. Whistleblowers, though technically part of
the industry, develop a fundamentally different kind of relationship
with securities regulators—and for very different reasons.
Whistleblowers are more likely motivated by financial rewards (or,
possibly, morality) rather than a desire to curry long-term favor with
regulators or influence over regulatory decision-making.171 Indeed,
whistleblowing would not likely be an effective way to shape
regulatory preferences. In theory then, to the extent regulators
develop partnerships with whistleblowers to understand the industry
and detect misconduct, these relationships could partially replace, or
at least reduce regulators’ dependence on, the kinds of reliance-based
industry relations that can give rise to capture costs.
3. Market Discipline
Another benefit of whistleblower programs is their potential to
improve market discipline. Market discipline generally refers to the
actions of multiple actors in the marketplace—institutions, depositors,
equity holders—in assessing the operations of any one individual
institution and responding accordingly.172 Common examples of
market discipline may include, in the most basic sense, selling one’s
equity shares or withdrawing deposits in response to negative
information about a financial institution. Institutions can also
discipline each other by, for example, refusing to lend to each other
or increasing the price to do so.173 As Kate Judge has written, banks
have the ability to “discipline” other banks if they perceive them to
be taking inappropriate risks.174
Information is key to market discipline, as “market participants
will impose meaningful discipline only to the extent that they can
accurately assess the risks to which a bank is exposed.”175 Misconduct,
however, can distort information or reduce its flow. False or
171. See id. at 214–15 (discussing the concept of the “revolving door,” where industry
insiders move between the public and private sector throughout their careers). See
generally Toni Makkai & John Braithwaite, In and Out of the Revolving Door: Making
Sense of Regulatory Capture, 12 J. PUB. POL’Y 61, 61–62 (1992) (arguing that the desire to
go out the revolving door accounts for two types of empirically recognized capture:
“sympathy with the particular problems that regulated firms confront in meeting
standards” and “identification with the industry”).
172. See Kathryn Judge, Interbank Discipline, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1262, 1277–78 (2013).
173. Id. at 1288–89.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1278; see Bartlett, supra note 18, at 382–83 (describing the disclosure
requirements currently imposed on U.S. banks and calling for particular types of
disclosure requirements as a means of improving market discipline).
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misleading disclosures in particular—the most common type of
misconduct about which whistleblowers report to the SEC—decrease
market participants’ ability to exercise effective discipline by
diminishing their ability to accurately assess an institution’s financial
activities and exposures.
Whistleblowers, meanwhile, can increase information about a
financial institution. First, whistleblowers can reduce the incidence of
inaccurate financial statements. They can also indirectly funnel
information to the public about the efficacy of a firm’s internal
compliance system and frequency of its employees’ misconduct.
Although whistleblowers’ tips are not public, if a tip yields legitimate
information, then the repercussions are likely to become public
knowledge. Commission investigations become visible to outsiders
and regulatory actions—like lawsuits or fines—must be disclosed by a
firm.176 By bringing more misconduct-related information to light,
whistleblowing could thus trigger a disciplining effect whereby
institutions withdraw from or decline to deal with those that have
been involved in or associated with serious misconduct.
With respect to large financial institutions in particular, these
interbank consequences can be significant. As Judge writes,
[a] disciplining bank can reduce its actual credit exposure to the
disciplined bank by refusing to extend new loans or enter into
new agreements with the bank, terminating existing
arrangements, and seeking to exit current arrangements [with
the bank] by assigning them to a third party.177
The prospect of such market discipline that might follow a
whistleblower’s tip may serve as a powerful deterrent (or incentive to
improve compliance) in the first instance.
4. Public Participation
Whistleblower programs also benefit the public and the markets
by increasing civic participation in finance, consistent with a legal and
regulatory tradition of providing the public with a role in enforcing
certain laws that touch on key matters of public concern.
176. SEC Regulation S-K, Item 103, requires disclosure of “any material pending legal
proceeding” or any material legal proceeding “known to be contemplated by
governmental authorities.” 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (2015). Notably, however, financial
institutions may not be required to disclose SEC investigations or so-called Wells Notices,
which recommend an enforcement action be taken. See In re Lions Gate Entm’t Corp.
Sec. Litig., No. 14-cv-5197 (JGK), 2016 WL 297722, at *4, *12–14 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2016);
see also JP Morgan Chase & Co., Annual Report (Form 10K) 8, 88, 297 (Feb. 24, 2015).
177. Judge, supra note 172, at 1289.
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Broadly speaking, there is a long history in the Anglo-Saxon
legal tradition of allowing private citizens to assist the state in certain
enforcement matters. Perhaps the earliest example of this is the use of
the qui tam writ, which developed in the English common law.178
Beginning in the thirteenth century, qui tam writs enabled private
parties who had suffered private wrongs to bring suits in royal courts
if determined to be in the royal (i.e., public) interest.179 Both in
England and then later in colonial America, qui tam suits were used
to help the state enforce public (usually criminal) laws at times when
the state lacked an effective police force.180 Through the use of qui
tam, private enforcers became such important stopgaps in the state’s
enforcement machinery that the first statute codifying the qui tam
writ in the fourteenth century also added incentives for private
accusers to assist the state by affording them one-fourth of any share
in the penalty imposed.181
The qui tam writ later served as the basis for the U.S. False
Claims Act (“FCA”) of 1863182—then known as the “Lincoln Law”—
which was addressed to the fraud perpetrated against the U.S.
government by its suppliers during the Civil War.183 The FCA allowed
private parties (“relators”) to bring suits on behalf of the United
States for fraud against the federal government.184 If successful, the
relators received a portion of the recovery as their “bounty.”185 Qui
tam suits were not much used again until the 1980s, at which point
they were reincarnated in a revised False Claims Act.186 Though
deployed only spottily in the following decades, there were a good
many FCA cases after the financial crisis.187 In the past few years,
178. Note, The History and Development of Qui Tam, 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 81, 83
(1972). “Qui tam” is short for “qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso” or “he who as
much for the king as for himself.” Id.
179. Id. at 83–85.
180. Id. at 85–86, 95.
181. Id. at 86.
182. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2012).
183. RAJEEV K. GOEL & MICHAEL A. NELSON, BOFIT, EFFECTIVENESS OF
WHISTLEBLOWER LAWS IN COMBATING CORRUPTION 5 (2013), http://www.suomenpankki
.fi/bofit_en/tutkimus/tutkimusjulkaisut/dp/pages/dp0913.aspx [http://perma.cc/LM9R-VTRY].
184. Engstrom, supra note 17, at 1246; see Zaring, supra note 35, at 1455–56.
185. Engstrom, supra note 17, at 1246.
186. See id. at 1270.
187. See Justice Department Recovers Nearly $6 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in
Fiscal Year 2014, DOJ (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-departmentrecovers-nearly-6-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2014 [http://perma.cc/VMB2UYLZ]. See generally Memorandum from William P. Barr, Assistant U.S. Attorney Gen.,
to Richard L. Thornburgh, U.S. Attorney Gen., Constitutionality of the Qui Tam
Provisions of the False Claims Act (July 18, 1989), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files
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enforcement agencies have attempted to hold accountable those
actors that allegedly committed fraud.188 In fact, FCA suits have been
used far more than criminal prosecutions to address misbehavior
related to the crisis: the Justice Department recovered nearly $5
billion from FCA actions in 2012, with $1.4 billion of that sum related
to housing and mortgage fraud.189 Criminal prosecutions, on the other
hand, have “been few and far between.”190 Given past success with qui
tam, Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower rules “borrow[] heavily” from the
FCA.191
In parallel to the qui tam tradition, Congress has also given
private citizens authority to enforce public law by other means where
crucial public interests are at stake. These grants of authority are
often stylized as private attorney general statutes. As Olatunde
Johnson describes it, “[t]he case for the private attorney general . . . is
that it supplements what even an ideally constituted, well-funded, and
vigorous public enforcement agency could do.”192 “Private litigation
engages the resources of a multitude of private actors in rooting out”
some public law problem—classically civil rights violations.193
In J.I. Case Co. v. Borak,194 a suit under section 14(a) of the
Exchange Act, the Supreme Court extended the private attorney
general theory to the securities context,195 confirming that financial
law was another area of key importance to the U.S. public.196 As
interpreted by subsequent courts, the private attorney general theory
justified not only authorizing (as with qui tam) but actually
subsidizing suits that “effectuate[] a strong Congressional policy

/olc/opinions/1989/07/31/op-olc-v013-p0207.pdf [http://perma.cc/F8JG-TDEQ] (discussing
a series of ongoing federal questions and background information related to qui tam suits
pending at the time of writing).
188. See Zaring, supra note 35, at 1411.
189. Justice Department Recovers Nearly $6 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal
Year 2014, supra note 187.
190. Zaring, supra note 35, at 1437.
191. Douglas W. Baruch & Nancy N. Barr, The SEC’s Whistleblower Program: What the
SEC Has Learned from the False Claims Act About Avoiding Whistleblower Abuses, 2
HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 28, 28–29 (2011), http://www.hblr.org/?p=1566 [http://perma.cc
/RZA4-8GTG]. The Dodd-Frank whistleblower rules do not include a qui tam provision,
however. Id. at 29.
192. Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Beyond the Private Attorney General: Equality Directives
in American Law, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1339, 1347 (2012).
193. Id.
194. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
195. Id. at 430–31; see also Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 390–91 (1970)
(equitably awarding attorney’s fees in a suit under section 14(a) of the Exchange Act).
196. See Mills, 396 U.S. at 396–97.
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which has benefited a large class of people.”197 As a result, private
citizens have the power to enforce the securities laws by bringing
private suits for damages under a range of statutory grants. These
“rights” of action can be found in section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5,198 section 22 of the
Commodities Exchange Act,199 and section 1962(c) of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”).200
Financial whistleblower programs could thus be seen as part of
this lengthy tradition of enlisting private citizens in matters of public
regulatory concern and, specifically, affording the public an
opportunity to hold financial actors accountable. When viewed in that
light, whistleblower programs may offer some additional benefits
arising from increased public expression and participation in the
enforcement of financial regulation. Specifically, giving the public a
stake in holding the industry accountable—even if for self-interested
reasons—may improve the industry’s legitimacy. Even if somewhat
intangible, such benefits could have real economic impact to the
extent they bolster consumer confidence and overall financial
stability.201
5. Financial Culture
Finally, to the extent that whistleblower programs strengthen
norms against misconduct in financial institutions, these programs
may also improve financial culture and ethics.
197. La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 98 (N.D. Cal. 1972); see also Civil Rights
Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2012)).
198. See Parkcentral Glob. Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Holdings SE, 763 F.3d 198, 200
(2d Cir. 2014) (referring to section 10(b) as “the basic antifraud provision of the U.S.
securities laws”).
199. See Loginovskaya v. Batratchenko, 764 F.3d 266, 270 (2d Cir. 2014).
200. Section 1964(c) of the RICO statute provides for a civil cause of action by “[a]ny
person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962.” 18
U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2012).
201. The Commission also considered benefits accruing from strengthened links
between market stability and consumer trust:
[O]ne of the issues that may affect capital formation in the economy is investor
confidence in the sense of investors trusting in the fairness of financial markets, of
which their perception of the effectiveness and comprehensiveness of the
regulatory regime is an important part. If investors fear theft, fraud, manipulation,
insider trading, or conflicted investment advice, their trust in the markets will be
low, both in the primary market for issuance or in the secondary market for
trading. This would increase the cost of raising capital, which would impair capital
formation . . . .
Proposed Whistleblower Rule, supra note 87, at 70,518.
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Whistleblowing has an inherently ethical and moral dimension.
Virtue ethics were in fact one of the earliest justifications for
corporate whistleblower programs in the United States. As one
scholarly account notes, “public administration ethics” in the first part
of the twentieth century developed a certain “canon,” which endorsed
the idea of the whistleblower.202 And by emphasizing or elevating the
latent moral aspect of whistleblowing, regulators could leverage
whistleblower programs as a means of improving the industry’s
culture203—thus advancing another priority that is high on the
regulatory agenda today.204
To do so, regulators could frame whistleblowing in terms of the
industry’s professional, ethical obligations. One way to do that is by
orienting whistleblower goals within the established framework of
industry self-regulation. Though support for industry self-regulation
has ebbed and flowed in the past few decades, it is by now an
embedded feature in the architecture of financial regulation. Today,
many financial systems worldwide have significant self-governing
aspects that work in tandem with government oversight. In the
United States, for example, self-regulatory organizations like
registered stock exchanges and the Financial Industry Regulatory
Association (“FINRA”) perform a number of day-to-day oversight
and enforcement functions, which are ultimately overseen by the
SEC.205
At face value, whistleblower regimes fit well within the selfregulatory paradigm as a system of informally delegated enforcement
that operates by tapping into the industry’s first-hand insight into
misconduct.206 And if approached as a matter of industry self202. See H. George Frederickson, Searching for Virtue in the Public Life, in ETHICS IN
PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 91, 95 (H. George Frederickson & Richard K. Ghere eds., 2d ed.
2013).
203. Gwendolyn Gordon & David Zaring, Ethical Bankers (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
204. See, e.g., Alberto G. Musalem, Why Focus on Culture?, FED. RES. BANK N.Y.
(Nov.
23,
2015), https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2015/mus151123
[http://perma.cc/D7LB-L38S].
205. See Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. Law No. 94-29, § 26(b), 89 Stat. 97,
170 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78f (2012)) (giving the Commission power to
supervise SROs); see also Eric J. Pan, Organizing Regional Systems: The US Example, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 188, 198 (Niamh Moloney, Ellis
Ferran & Jennifer Payne eds., 2015) (noting that in the past “[t]he SEC would oversee the
SROs, but would only intervene if it determined that the SROs were failing to carry out
their respective regulatory missions”).
206. See Omarova, supra note 138, at 434 n.85 (arguing the merits of industry selfregulation and urging “attention to the regulatory potential of using the industry’s relative
information advantage”).
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regulation, whistleblower programs—like other self-regulatory
measures—could contribute in a meaningful way to ethical standard
setting in the financial services sector.207 More concretely, in a selfregulatory approach to whistleblower programs, regulators would
place significant emphasis on firm-level policies and procedures—that
is, by fashioning rules that seek to strengthen the whistleblowing
programs that operate internal to the industry. The United Kingdom
provides an interesting model, where recent reforms require certain
financial firms by March 2016 to designate a “whistleblowing
champion,” a non-executive director whose role is to ensure the
“integrity, independence and effectiveness” of the firm’s
whistleblower’s policies.208
This kind of regulatory innovation, which has a distinctly selfregulatory flavor, has the potential to reduce the social and
professional stigma that currently surrounds whistleblowing. And
finding ways to motivate firms to internalize whistleblowing as a
valuable and respected practice is an important step in fomenting a
culture that disapproves of misconduct. As one group of
commentators noted with respect to the London Interbank Offered
Rate (“LIBOR”) scandal: “It is not enough to encourage the use of
the whistleblowing mechanism if . . . employees are not encouraged to
also challenge social conformity.”209 There, part of the problem was
that industry actors did not recognize that their behavior in
manipulating the benchmark was wrongful.210
Delegating whistleblower requirements and responsibilities to
firms and giving them some autonomy to shape and manage the
process may be an effective way to cultivate such institutional and
industry buy-in to whistleblowing in a way that has not quite taken
hold vis-à-vis the SEC’s (externally oriented) program. Put
differently, delegated whistleblower regimes might help to
denormalize the kinds of misconduct that seem to have become

207. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78f (2012).
208. See Bank of England, Prudential Regulation Authority, Whistleblowing in
Deposit-Takers, PRA-Designated Firms and Insurers, Policy Statement PS24/15, at 8
(Oct. 2015) (UK), http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Documents/publications/ps/2015
/ps2415.pdf [http://perma.cc/NZ56-GRW9].
209. PWC, THREATS TO THE FINANCIAL SERVICES SECTOR 16 (2014), https://www
.pwc.com/gx/en/financial-services/publications/assets/pwc-gecs-2014-threats-to-thefinancial-services-sector.pdf [http://perma.cc/T8UM-C6PH].
210. Id.
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accepted as normal in the past several years—that is, improve the
financial industry’s culture.211
C.

Whistleblowing and Its Costs

Notwithstanding the benefits of whistleblowers, whistleblower
programs are not cost free. The following Section explores the costs
of whistleblower programs, particularly those that were not amply
considered by the Commission in the proposed rule.212
1. Firm Compliance
One of the industry’s more prominent concerns about
whistleblower programs—at the program’s beginning and now—is
that they can undermine internal firm compliance.213 Specifically,
some have suggested that government programs, which incentivize
employees to report misconduct externally, work at cross-purposes to
firms’ ability to address misconduct in-house.214 The concern is that
211. Kaptein gives several reasons why organizational culture bears on an employee’s
propensity to blow the whistle on wrongdoing, including because: (1) it “indicates
acceptable and unacceptable behavior that employees take into account when they decide
how to respond”; (2) it determines what kind of behavior is legitimate by empowering
employees “to follow up reports of wrongdoing, as they and others know that responding
to observed wrongdoing is consistent with the prevailing culture”; (3) and it shapes how
employees respond since employees are less likely to respond to wrongdoing by blowing
the whistle if they perceive it “as an effect of a failing ethical culture.” Muel Kaptein,
From Inaction to External Whistleblowing: The Influence of the Ethical Culture of
Organizations on Employee Responses to Observed Wrongdoing 8–9 (Erasmus Research
Inst. of Mgmt., Paper No. ERS-2009-047-ORG, 2009), http://repub.eur.nl/pub/16600/ERS2009-047-ORG.pdf [http://perma.cc/TD9G-Q5WZ].
212. For an excellent analysis of the costs and benefits of whistleblower programs that
complements this discussion, see Rose, supra note 17.
213. A compliance function is “an independent function that identifies, assesses,
advises on, monitors and reports on” risk associated with failure to comply with laws,
regulations, and “standards of good practice.” BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION,
CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT: THE COMPLIANCE FUNCTION IN BANKS ¶ 10 (2003).
Likewise, most corporations—especially in the financial industry—have some form of
enterprise risk management, of which compliance is a part. Enterprise risk management
involves systems and structures to deal with “agency cost control,” among other risks to
the business. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34
J. CORP. L. 967, 981 (2009).
214. See Ebersole, supra note 17, at 137 (noting this criticism and arguing that internal
compliance is more effective and efficient than external reporting). The Chamber of Commerce
has argued that whistleblower programs “put trial lawyer profits ahead of effective compliance
and corporate governance.” U.S. Chamber Warns New SEC Whistleblower Rule Will
Undermine Corporate Compliance Programs, U.S. CHAMBER COM. (May 24, 2011),
https://www.uschamber.com/press-release/us-chamber-warns-new-sec-whistleblower-rule-willundermine-corporate-compliance [http://perma.cc/B5TB-WBNE]. In a September 24, 2010
hearing before the House Committee on Financial Services, the Senior Vice President for
Policy and Advocacy at the Society of Corporate Secretaries and Governance Professionals
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the hefty cash bounties from the government will diminish an
employee’s incentive to approach the firm with possible misconduct
issues before turning to external regulators.215 As one Commissioner
stated, “[a]n inherent risk of the approach adopted in the final rule, is
that the monetary sums at stake will provide a significant enough
incentive for whistleblowers to completely bypass internal reporting
in favor of coming straight to the Commission.”216 In a similar vein,
former Congressman Michael Oxley wrote that the Dodd-Frank
whistleblower provisions went “too far” by “incentiviz[ing]
[whistleblowers] to go outside the structure of the company” and
“significantly reduc[ing] the effectiveness of internal due process.”217
In drafting the rules, the Commission did, apparently, attempt to
mitigate this possible cost. As implemented, the program purports to
“encourage[] [employees] to work within their company’s own
compliance structure, if appropriate.”218 Accordingly, section 21F6(a)(4) provides that the Commission will consider, in determining
the award, whether the whistleblower had reported internally.219
Likewise, pursuant to section 21F-6(b)(3), the Commission can

urged that “employee[s] will now have a significant financial incentive to bypass raising the
issue with the company at all for fear of losing the bounty.” Executive Compensation
Oversight After the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 27 (2010) (statement of Darla C. Stuckey,
Senior Vice President, Policy and Advocacy, Society of Corporate Secretaries and
Governance Professionals). But see Mary Jo White, The SEC as the Whistleblower’s
Advocate, SEC (Apr. 30, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/chair-white-remarks-atgarrett-institute.html [http://perma.cc/EN3G-YRXU] (stating that “[a]ll indications are that
internal compliance functions are as strong as ever—if not stronger—and that insiders
continue to report possible violations internally first”).
215. See Richard Carrigan & Asheesh Agarwal, How to Save Compliance Programs After
Dodd-Frank, LAW360 (Apr. 14, 2011), http://www.law360.com/articles/236114/how-to-savecompliance-programs-after-dodd-frank [http://perma.cc/2LHW-N7MF]; Michael T. Gass &
Michael R. Dube, The Problem with Compliance Whistleblowers, LAW360 (May 6, 2015),
http://www.law360.com/articles/651304/the-problem-with-compliance-whistleblowers [http://
perma.cc/Q88H-XR9B] (noting that “many argue” that awarding compliance officers as
whistleblowers “undermine[s] companies’ internal compliance function”); see also Rose,
supra note 17, at 1278 (discussing this critique).
216. Casey Statement, supra note 85.
217. B. Nathaniel Garrett, Comment, Dodd-Frank’s Whistleblower Provision Fails to
Go Far Enough: Making the Case for a Qui Tam Provision in a Revised Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 765, 766 (2012) (quoting E-mail from Mr. Michael G.
Oxley, Of Counsel, Baker & Hostetler LLP, former Congressman and Chairman of the
House Fin. Servs. Comm., to B. Nathaniel Garrett (Oct. 28, 2011, 2:54 PM) (on file with B.
Nathaniel Garrett)).
218. 2015 WHISTLEBLOWER REPORT, supra note 96, at 4.
219. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(a)(4) (2015).
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reduce the award amount if a whistleblower has interfered with
internal compliance.220
Still, as the program has developed, incentives to report
externally in lieu of internally seem to loom larger each year.
Recently, judicial and agency interpretations of the statutorily
mandated aspects of the whistleblower provisions have further
cemented employees’ incentives to report externally rather than
internally. Circuit courts are now divided over the definition of a
whistleblower. Recall that section 21F(a)(6) of the Exchange Act
defines
“whistleblower”
as
“any
individual
who
provides . . . information relating to a violation of the securities laws
to the Commission.”221 And these whistleblowers are protected, under
section 21F(h)(1)(A)(iii), against retaliation by their employers.222
According to the SEC’s interpretation of its final rule implementing
the whistleblower program, however, this retaliation protection also
extends to those who report internally, not only to the Commission.223
Not surprisingly, however, courts differ over that interpretation.
In Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C.,224 the Fifth Circuit held that,
because the term “whistleblower” is defined by the statute,
whistleblower protections extend only to those who externally report
to the SEC.225 Later, the Second Circuit deferred to the SEC’s
interpretation of the term whistleblower in Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy
LLC,226 holding that the Dodd-Frank Act also protects internal
whistleblowers.227 One implication of this circuit split, so long as it
remains, is that employees may be marginally more incentivized to
report externally first—ensuring that they are protected from
retaliation, especially outside of the Second Circuit’s jurisdiction.
In addition, the SEC has also made clear that corporations lack
any real means consistent with the Exchange Act of discouraging
external reporting. As briefly mentioned earlier, in April 2015, the
SEC announced that it had fined a global engineering and
construction firm, KBR, $130,000 for attempting to stifle
220. Id. § 240.21F-6(b)(3).
221. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012).
222. Id. § 78u-6(h)(1).
223. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.21F-2(a)(2), 240.21F-2(b)(1)(iii); see also Nicholas S. Goldin,
SEC Interpretation of “Whistleblower” Definition, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Oct. 14, 2015), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/10/04/secinterpretation-of-whistleblower-definition/ [http://perma.cc/6E8X-XQ2H].
224. 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013).
225. Id. at 629–30.
226. 801 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2015).
227. Id. at 155.
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whistleblowing through restrictive contractual language.228 In the
course of internal investigations into illegal or unethical conduct,
KBR would require employees to sign a confidentiality statement that
prohibited employees from disclosing any information learned in the
course of the investigation; breaches could result in disciplinary action
or termination.229 KBR was required to amend the contract to include
an exception for communications to federal government agencies.230
The KBR suit, according to one prominent whistleblower attorney,
was a “warning shot” to U.S. corporations and indicative of more
such actions to come.231
Finally, in 2014 and 2015, the Commission appeared increasingly
open to awarding compliance officers for their information about
internal misconduct. Though aware of the conflicts this might create,
the Commission suggested in its cost-benefit analysis that the costs
associated with allowing awards to compliance employees could be
mitigated by the requirement for “independent knowledge”; that is,
information that was not acquired in the course of one’s compliance
or audit duties.232 Yet the final rule contains several exceptions that
may swallow the rule.233 In August 2014, the Commission announced
a $300,000 award to a whistleblower with an audit and compliance
function, invoking an exception for cases in which misconduct had
been reported internally, but the firm took no action within 120
days.234 Later, in April 2015, the Commission announced an award of
between $1.4 and $1.6 million to another compliance employee,235
invoking yet another exception for compliance whistleblowers who
have “a reasonable basis to believe that disclosure of the information
to the Commission is necessary to prevent the relevant entity from
engaging in conduct that is likely to cause substantial injury to the

228. KBR, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 74,619, 2015 WL 1481158 (Apr. 1, 2015).
229. Id. ¶¶ 5–8.
230. Id. ¶¶ 8–10.
231. Scott Higham, SEC Finds that KBR Confidentiality Agreements ‘Stifled’
Whistleblowers, WASH. POST. (Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations
/sec-finds-that-kbr-confidentiality-agreements-stifled-whistleblowers/2015/04/01/c78f6708d884-11e4-8103-fa84725dbf9d_story.html [http://perma.cc/F59K-AE4K].
232. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(1)–(2) (2015); Proposed Whistleblower Rule, supra note
87, at 70,491–94.
233. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(v).
234. SEC Announces $300,000 Whistleblower Award to Audit and Compliance
Professional Who Reported Company’s Wrongdoing, SEC (Aug. 29, 2014), http://www.sec
.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370542799812 [http://perma.cc/48K6-EZVQ];
see 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(v)(C).
235. SEC Announces Million-Dollar Whistleblower Award to Compliance Officer,
supra note 146.
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financial interest or property of the entity or investors.”236 As some
commentators have noted, as the “whistleblower program matures, it
is clear that the SEC is willing to use the available exceptions to
reward company compliance personnel.”237 The concern with this
trend is that compliance officers—those who should, more than
anyone else, deal with misconduct internally—may now have
incentive to abrogate this duty and go straight to the SEC.
There is significant cost to financial institutions when they are
unable to manage misconduct with self-initiated investigation and
internal assessment or audits, before regulatory involvement. For one,
rules that encourage external reporting instead of internal reporting
can reduce the efficacy of corporate compliance efforts. As one
commentator noted:
Corporate compliance programs depend on a robust flow of
information in order to be effective. Indeed, information is the
lifeblood of such programs. Diverting a large portion of that
flow of information to the government will impair companies’
ability to step in and interrupt violations at an early stage. This
does not benefit investors, and it is at odds with the purposes of
the securities laws.238
Moreover, and relatedly, programs that subvert internal
reporting may also reduce the energy and strategy that financial
institutions are willing to invest in compliance. As two industry
lawyers have noted, “[C]ompanies that have made the commitment
and incurred the expense necessary for a robust internal audit and
compliance effort will be left to wonder if doing so is truly in their
interest.”239 Overall, if compliance seems futile, whistleblower
programs might discourage firms’ efforts to build strong programs,
and “companies that have chosen not to make that commitment will
not only have secured a competitive advantage, they may find
themselves [a] new model.”240

236. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(v)(A).
237. Martin Weinstein, Robert Meyer & Jeffrey Clark, Company Compliance Officer
Wins a Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Award, WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER LLP (Apr. 27,
2015), http://www.willkie.com/~/media/Files/Publications/2015/04/Company_Compliance
_Officer_Wins_a_Dodd_Frank_Whistleblower_Award.pdf [http://perma.cc/BET5-4L8X].
238. Casey Statement, supra note 85.
239. Gass & Dube, supra note 215.
240. Id.
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2. Regulatory Resources
A second potential cost of a whistleblower program, particularly
a cash-incentivized one, is that it can encourage frivolous reporting
and thus overwhelm investigative resources.241 One scholar noted at
the program’s outset that the SEC “already receives more tips than it
can reasonably handle.”242
Though one can only speculate, the data on the SEC
whistleblower program suggest this may be an issue. As
Commissioner Casey initially expressed, “[a]ny triage process [to
manage incoming tips and complaints] will be challenging, and a highvolume flow of information will strain our existing triage resources.
The staff has assured me that they’ll be able to handle the incoming
flow of complaints, but I fear they are not being adequately
circumspect.”243 Several years in, the data may confirm this concern.
At the close of fiscal year 2015, the Commission has received over
14,000 tips since the program’s inception but has only made twentytwo awards.244
These numbers may suggest that the SEC program incentivizes
frivolous tips.245 The Commission has reported several extreme cases.
For example, in May 2014, it issued a final order denying claims in
connection with 143 cases; and it had previously denied fifty-three
other claims from the same person.246 Another whistleblower, who
had made twenty-five separate claims, was also denied for “knowingly
and willfully ma[king] false, fictitious, and fraudulent statements and
representations to the Commission over the course of several
years.”247
The cost of inundating regulators with baseless information is
that it further strains the already limited investigative resources of the

241. See Garrett, supra note 217, at 782–83 (noting that Dodd-Frank “created
incentives for reporting without requiring the whistleblower to have some ‘skin in the
game’ ” and “creates an environment where the whistleblower can easily provide a tip to
the SEC and then sit back, without any further effort, to await a potential pay-day; the
whistleblower only has to fill out a 6-page document to submit their tip” (quoting
Ebersole, supra note 17, at 162–63)).
242. Jayne W. Barnard, Evolutionary Enforcement at the Securities and Exchange
Commission, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 403, 412 (2010); see also Rose, supra note 17, at 1238,
1276 (discussing “nonmeritorious tips”).
243. Casey Statement, supra note 85.
244. 2015 WHISTLEBLOWER REPORT, supra note 96, at 1, 16, 21.
245. Alternatively, these data may also suggest that enforcement agencies simply lack
the resources to pursue all of the high-quality information that whistleblowers provide.
246. 2015 WHISTLEBLOWER REPORT, supra note 96, at 14.
247. Id.
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SEC.248 The need not only to triage, but also to carefully evaluate on a
prima facie basis the likely integrity of the information, may be
wasteful of regulatory resources, which could be put to better use
investigating higher quality information or enforcing more serious
cases.
3. Antisocial Norms
A third potential cost of whistleblowing programs is a social one.
In some quarters, enlisting private citizens to aid the government’s
enforcement initiatives raises concerns of a surveillance society,
disloyal behavior, or confidentiality breaches.249 In some European
and Asian countries, for instance, whistleblowing has these negative
connotations. In Russia, for example, the word for whistleblower—
“donos” or “donoschik”—translates to “informant” and colloquially
means something similar to “snitch.”250 For some Russians, it even
connotes a relationship to the country’s history of repression during
Stalinist rule.251 Likewise, in Germany, some scholars have suggested
that whistleblower incentives might be associated with Gestapo-type
reliance on denunciations.252 And in China, efforts to establish
anonymous whistleblower hotlines may conjure memories of the
Cultural Revolution, where “children were encouraged to inform on
their parents, neighbors on their neighbors, and students on their
teachers.”253
Some also believe that whistleblower programs can impose social
costs within an organization by eroding corporate loyalty. A
prominent 1975 article in the Harvard Business Review quoted the
then-chairman of the board of General Motors for the view that
programs to encourage whistleblowers were “enemies of business”
that “create suspicion and disharmony and pry into the proprietary
interests of the business.”254 Professor Schmidt has noted more
248. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
249. See generally ETHAN BROWN, SNITCH: INFORMANTS, COOPERATORS & THE
CORRUPTION OF JUSTICE (2007) (describing the various ways in which “snitching” is
viewed across segments of American society); MARK WORTH, WHISTLEBLOWING IN
EUROPE 15–16, 71–72 (2013) (discussing common negative perceptions and reactions
towards whistleblowers in a number of European countries).
250. Jasmine Martirossian, Russia and Her Ghosts of the Past, in THE STRUGGLE
AGAINST CORRUPTION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 81, 91 (Roberta Ann Johnson ed.,
2004).
251. Id.
252. See WORTH, supra note 249, at 47–48.
253. See WHISTLEBLOWING HANDBOOK, supra note 109, at 40.
254. Kenneth D. Walters, Your Employees’ Right to Blow the Whistle, HARV. BUS.
REV., July–Aug. 1975, at 26, 27.
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recently, “management as well as other employees tend to regard
whistle blowers as disloyal.”255 The tension between loyalty and
confidentiality on the one hand, and whistleblowing on the other, has
already begun to arise in connection with the Dodd-Frank program as
well. In particular, some firms have sued employees (or former
employees) for common law breaches of contract or fiduciary duty
(or under various federal laws) in response to employees that engage
in self-discovery to shore up a whistleblower claim.256
Finally, some detractors have argued that whistleblower
programs backed by cash bounties are “morally corrupting because
they ‘monetize virtue.’ ”257 As Professor Rapp points out, the social
cost is similar to that which arises in connection with a duty to rescue
in tort law, “on the grounds that a financial obligation to rescue would
cheapen the moral value of heroic service.”258
The social costs of whistleblowing are admittedly quite difficult
to predict and even more challenging to quantify. In the United States
at least, Congress decided (even if implicitly) that the possible costs of
antisocial behavior that a whistleblowing program might encourage
are outweighed by the social costs of undetected and frequent
financial misconduct. Nonetheless, as the financial markets continue
to globalize, whistleblower programs are likely to become an issue of
increasing transnational regulatory concern and on the agenda of
international financial regulation. Accordingly, U.S. regulators should
be careful to bear these social costs in mind when debating whether
and how far to expand whistleblower initiatives.259

255. Matthias Schmidt, “Whistle Blowing” Regulation and Accounting Standards
Enforcement in Germany and Europe—An Economic Perspective, 25 INT’L REV. L. &
ECON. 143, 151 (2005).
256. See R. Scott Oswald, Risks in Fighting Whistleblowers Over Confidentiality,
LAW360 (Mar. 31, 2014, 6:43 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/523392/risks-in-fightingwhistleblowers-over-confidentiality [http://perma.cc/C6CN-5378 (staff-uploaded archive)]
(citing such cases as examples).
257. Rapp, supra note 17, at 123 (quoting Barnard, supra note 242, at 413).
258. Id.
259. Tony Porter has argued, “the experience of transnational regulatory reform after
the crisis indicates that the trends of the past three decades, which have involved a growth
in transnational interdependence in financial transactions and governance, is continuing
rather than reversing.” Tony Porter, Introduction: Post-Crisis Transnational Financial
Regulation and Complexity in Global Governance, in TRANSNATIONAL FINANCIAL
REGULATION AFTER THE CRISIS 3, 5 (Tony Porter ed., 2014).
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4. Unilateral Extraterritorialism
Since the crisis, several major financial economies have either
adopted or somehow reinvigorated financial whistleblower laws.260
Yet in practice, whistleblower programs in Europe are far afield from
the SEC whistleblower model.261 Many foreign jurisdictions remain
resistant to strongly cash-motivated (and broadly defined)
whistleblower laws.262
Indeed, the whistleblower apparatus in several major financial
economies in Europe differs notably from the Commission’s program.
Take Germany, for example. Germany is a financial powerhouse of
the European Union and home to the “global systemically important
bank” (“G-SIB”) Deutsche Bank.263 Yet would-be whistleblowers in
Germany face a challenging environment, with possible professional
consequences attached to blowing the whistle, and a court system that
appears to place a premium on employees’ loyalty to their
employers.264 Outside the health and security contexts, Germany lacks
260. This Article mostly focuses on European countries because they are home to a
significant proportion of “global systemically important banks” or “G-SIBs.” See PAUL
GLASSERMAN & BERT LOUDIS, OFFICE OF FIN. RESEARCH, A COMPARISON OF U.S.
AND INTERNATIONAL GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT BANKS 1, 5 (2015), https://
financialresearch.gov/briefs/files/OFRbr-2015-07_A-Comparison-of-US-and-International
-Global-Systemically-Important-Banks.pdf [http://perma.cc/V39S-5EXL].
261. See infra notes 263–76 and accompanying text. In 2013, Transparency
International found that only four European countries—the United Kingdom,
Luxemburg, Romania, and Slovenia—had laws to protect whistleblowers from workplace
retaliation that were considered “advanced.” TRANSPARENCY INT’L, WHISTLEBLOWING
IN EUROPE: LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR WHISTLEBLOWERS IN THE EU 8 (2013). Though
beyond the scope of this Article, it bears mention that there is a longstanding and ongoing
debate in the corporate law literature on convergence versus divergence regarding
international corporate governance standards. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier
Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 468 (2001); see also
CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2–6 (Jeffrey N.
Gordon & Mark J. Roe eds., 2004); Douglas M. Branson, The Very Uncertain Prospect of
“Global” Convergence in Corporate Governance, 34 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 321, 332–33
(2001); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence
in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 641, 679–80 (1999).
262. See infra notes 274–76 and accompanying text; see also Chris Crowe, International
Regulators at Odds on Offering Financial Incentives to Whistleblowers, INT’L BAR ASS’N
(Oct. 30, 2014), http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=a0064f1d-ed5b-44948d66-158f737b84f6 [http://perma.cc/MJ96-YV64].
263. See FIN. STABILITY BD., 2015 UPDATE OF LIST OF GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY
IMPORTANT BANKS (G-SIBS) 2 (2015), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content
/uploads/2015-update-of-list-of-global-systemically-important-banks-G-SIBs.pdf [http://perma
.cc/E58Q-BFAL].
264. See TRANSPARENCY INT’L, supra note 261, at 47; TRANSPARENCY INT’L AUSTL.,
WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION LAWS IN G20 COUNTRIES 37 (Simon Wolfe et al. eds., 2014),
https://www.transparency.de/fileadmin/pdfs/Themen/Hinweisgebersysteme/WhistleblowerProtection-Laws-in-G20-Countries-Priorities-for-Action.pdf [http://perma.cc/7YQC-CQEJ];
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specific legislation that regulates or protects whistleblowing.265
Whistleblowers are expected—with some exception—to disclose
issues internally first,266 and there are no cash incentives for providing
information.267
France is similar.268 Also home to several G-SIBs, like BNP
Paribas and Crédit Agricole Group, France historically has been
resistant to whistleblower laws.269 French law, though it does permit
reporting in finance and banking, does not actively incentivize the
provision of insider information about financial misconduct.270

see also Listen Up! Effective Whistleblowing Management, LINKLATERS, http://www.linklaters
.com/Insights/ThoughtLeadership/Whistleblowing/Pages/Index.aspx (last updated Mar. 2014)
[http://perma.cc/JEM7-EEQN (dark archive)].
265. Verena Braeckeler-Kogel, Whistleblowing in Germany, SIMMONS & SIMMONS
ELEXICA (Apr. 29, 2015), http://aifmdinvestor.com/en/legal-topics/employment-and-benefits
/24-whistleblowing-in-germany [http://perma.cc/MZ5G-UBY9]; see also TIM MARSHALL &
MICHAEL J. SHEEHAN, DLA PIPER, WHISTLEBLOWING: AN EMPLOYER’S GUIDE TO
GLOBAL COMPLIANCE 21 (2d ed. 2015), https://www.dlapiper.com/~/media/Files/Insights
/Publications/2015/06/Whistleblowing_Law_Report_2015.pdf
[http://perma.cc/6AKJR3YG].
266. Lydia Dorn, Whistleblowing—What Protection Do Employees Have in Germany,
NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT (May 15, 2014), http://www.globalworkplaceinsider.com/2014/05
/whistleblowing-what-protection-do-employees-have-in-germany/
[http://perma.cc/E7ZAE7PE]; see also Gesetz über die Durchführung von Maßnahmen des Arbeitsschutzes zur
Verbesserung der Sicherheit und des Gesundheitsschutzes der Beschäftigten bei der Arbeit,
Arbeitsschutzgesetz [ArbSchG] [Labour Protection Act], Aug. 7, 1996, BGBL I at 1246–53
(Ger.); Michael Knigge, Europe, US Take Different Approaches to Whistle-Blowing, DW
(Sept. 5, 2010), http://www.dw.com/en/europe-us-take-different-approaches-to-whistleblowing/a-5965148 [http://perma.cc/H9KD-WLZE].
267. See Braeckeler-Kogel, supra note 265 (noting that such a payment “could
undermine [the whistleblowers’] credibility”).
268. In France and Germany “there are, at present, no express whistleblowing laws and
to gain protection in these jurisdictions a whistleblower has to rely on piecemeal rights
found in, for example, employment, anti-corruption and criminal laws.” MARSHALL &
SHEEHAN, supra note 265, at 7.
269. See, e.g., Frédéric Saffroy, Is France Against Whistleblowing?, SQUIRE PATTON
BOGGS: LA REVUE (Jan. 20, 2006), http://larevue.squirepattonboggs.com/Is-France-againstwhistleblowing_a1007.html [http://perma.cc/U2XN-L5JN]; see also supra notes 249–53
(discussing cultural reasons why states may be resistant to whistleblowing laws).
270. See Délibération n°2005-305 du 8 décembre 2005 portant autorisation unique de
traitements automatisés de données à caractère personnel mis en œuvre dans le cadre de
dispositifs d’alerte professionnelle [Deliberation No. 2005-305 of December 8, 2005 on
Single Authorization of Automated Processing of Personal Data Implemented as Part of
Whistleblowing Schemes], Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés
[CNIL] [National Commission for Computing and Liberties], Dec. 8, 2005,
http://www.cnil.fr/documentation/deliberations/deliberation/delib/83
[http://perma.cc
/PA6V-6K9V]; Ann J. LaFrance & Francesca Fellowes, Latest Regulation on
Whistleblowing in France: CNIL Extends Scope of Reporting and Supports Anonymity,
SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS (Feb. 2014), http://www.squirepattonboggs.com/insights
/publications/2014/02/latest-regulation-on-whistleblowing-in-france-cn__
[http://perma.cc/CT32-7LYL] (reaffirming that “[a]s before, the system should not
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Switzerland, which hosts several G-SIBs, like UBS and Credit
Suisse, may be “rocky terrain for whistleblowers.”271 As one scholar
described it,
any semblance of whistle blowing [in Switzerland] is couched in
very broad and vague corporate governance rules whose overall
import is a requirement that the board of directors takes
appropriate measures to ensure the organisation’s compliance
with the law, without specifically calling for a . . . whistle blower
protection scheme.272
In fact, disclosing banking information—considered to be business
secrets—to a government authority (domestic or foreign) could
actually trigger criminal liability.273 Though not intended to be a
comprehensive (or close to comprehensive) survey of European law
on whistleblowers, this overview illustrates that in several of the
European jurisdictions with substantial financial activity,
whistleblowers are not affirmatively incentivized and sometimes are
even exposed to negative workplace, social, or legal consequences.274

encourage anonymous reporting”); see also Oliver Proust, French Revised Framework For
Whistleblowing: Analysis, DATA PROTECTION L. & POL’Y, Feb. 2011, at 4,
https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/DPLP
_French_Revised_Framework_Proust.pdf [http://perma.cc/586V-GSJ7] (noting that “[t]he
enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, and the rapid proliferation of
whistleblowing hotlines within international organizations have compelled the European
Data Protection Authorities [and French authorities] to adopt a clear position regarding
such schemes”).
271. Whistleblowing in Switzerland: Rough Terrain, ECONOMIST (Dec. 5, 2015),
http://www.economist.com/news/business/21679456-two-court-cases-illustrate-strugglesemployees-who-allege-wrongdoing-rough-terrain [http://perma.cc/L6J3-DQRF]; see also
John Letzing, Swiss Whistleblower Rudolf Elmer Convicted of Violating Bank Secrecy Laws,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 19, 2015, 9:04 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/swiss-whistleblower-rudolf
-elmer-convicted-of-violating-bank-secrecy-laws-1421676277 [http://perma.cc/85TB-CE6Z
(dark archive)] (discussing the prosecution and conviction of a Swiss whistleblower for
violating Swiss bank-secrecy laws).
272. Herbert Kawadza, Analysis of Financial Services Sector Transparency Through Whistle
Blowing: The Case of South Africa and Switzerland 14 (SECO, Working Paper No. 30, 2014),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2613404 [http://perma.cc/V2CH-5FK6].
273. Id. at 15; see SCHWEIZERISCHES STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [CRIMINAL CODE]
Dec. 21, 1937, SR 311.0, art. 273 (Switz.), https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classifiedcompilation/19370083/201501010000/311.0.pdf [http://perma.cc/2EYD-8WUD].
274. As commentators of the English system have noted, PIDA did not “set out to
encourage whistleblowing—it merely aims to protect those who raise a particular type of
concern.” Jeanette Ashton, 15 Years of Whistleblowing Protection Under the Public
Interest Disclosure Act 1998: Are We Still Shooting the Messenger?, 44 INDUS. L.J. 29, 39
(2015) (quoting David Lewis, Ten Years of Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 Claims:
What Can We Learn from the Statistics and Recent Research?, 39 INDUS. L. J. 325, 328
(2010)).
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One can thus readily see considerable divergence between the
Commission’s whistleblower model—which proactively encourages
whistleblower information—and that of its European counterparts.
While there may be theoretical agreement between the United States
and some European regulators that whistleblowing is desirable and
effective,275 genuine convergence or coordination does not yet exist.276
In the absence of a more unified approach to whistleblower
information, the Commission has effectively taken a unilateral and
extraterritorial approach.277 Interested in receiving information from
the private markets abroad, the SEC has been clear that it will extend
its cash bounty to foreign citizens as well.278 The extraterritorialism
that this regulatory divergence has spurred also has costs.279

275. TIM MARSHALL & MICHAEL J. SHEEHAN, DLA PIPER, WHISTLEBLOWING: AN
EMPLOYER’S GUIDE TO GLOBAL COMPLIANCE 3 (1st ed. 2013), http://www.dlapiperuknow
.com/export/sites/uknow/products/files/uknow/DLA-Piper-WhistleblowingReport.pdf [http://perma.cc/GM6T-SFPG]; see WHISTLEBLOWING HANDBOOK, supra
note 109, at 350.
276. In China, the trend is the same. Although China has a whistleblower program on
the books, that law has been criticized by some as vague, overly limited, and potentially
hortatory due to the lack of institutional commitment to it. See MARSHALL & SHEEHAN,
supra note 265, at 17–18; see also Rachel Beller, Note, Whistleblower Protection
Legislation of the East and West: Can It Really Reduce Corporate Fraud and Improve
Corporate Governance? A Study of the Successes and Failures of Whistleblower Protection
Legislation in the US and China, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 873, 873–74, 894–98 (2011) (noting
such criticism while arguing that the Chinese whistleblower program will ultimately be a
success).
277. See generally Lawrence G. Baxter, William B. McGuire Professor of the Practice of
Law, Duke Univ. Sch. of Law, Extraterritorial Impacts of Recent Financial Regulation
Reforms: A Complex World of Global Finance 10–11 (June 28, 2014), http://scholarship.law
.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6044&context=faculty_scholarship
[http://perma.cc
/N28Q-S4HY] (discussing examples of extraterritoriality in the Volker Rule and
derivatives reform).
278. From 2011 through September 2014, 1136 foreign nationals filed whistleblower
disclosures to the SEC regarding reports on securities violations and foreign bribery.
STEPHEN M. KOHN, NAT’L WHISTLEBLOWERS CTR., THE IMPORTANCE OF
WHISTLEBLOWER REWARDS IN COMBATING INTERNATIONAL CORRUPTION 5 (Dec. 9,
2014), http://whistleblowers.nonprofitsoapbox.com/storage/whistleblowers/docs/BlogDocs/anticorruption-report.pdf [http://perma.cc/2VFS-LDL6]. In fiscal year 2014, the Commission
authorized a $30 million whistleblower award that was “the fourth award to a
whistleblower living in a foreign country.” SEC, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON
THE DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 10 (2014), https://www.sec.gov/about
/offices/owb/annual-report-2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/VTX8-7Q43]. The Commission
received 448 tips from abroad in 2014. Id. at 29. In fiscal year 2015, three awards were paid
to people outside of the United States, and the Commission received 421 tips from abroad.
2015 WHISTLEBLOWER REPORT, supra note 96, at 12, 30.
279. See Baxter, supra note 277, at 13–14 (listing a number of predicted challenges and
noting that “our efforts to develop common minimum standards are . . . likely to move
slowly forward, but at a very unpredictable pace and with numerous setbacks”).

94 N.C. L. REV. 861 (2016)

2016]

WHISTLEBLOWERS & INNOVATION

915

One cost associated with unilateral extraterritorialism is that the
Commission’s program may simply be less effective.280 Regulators in
one jurisdiction, like the United States, may be unable to obtain
information about the activities of private economic actors in another.
Consider a hypothetical based on the manipulation of LIBOR, in
which several global banks colluded for years to manipulate that
benchmark.281 Both the United States and United Kingdom would
have had an interest in the other regulator’s ability to detect the rate
manipulation much sooner. That is, inasmuch as the SEC would have
liked a private citizen to inform it of the misconduct, it would
arguably have been equally invested in regulatory programs that
afforded the opportunity and motivation for a U.K. citizen to make
that same information known to U.K. financial regulators—and vice
versa. But where the Commission’s program conflicts with another
jurisdiction’s rules for whistleblowers, foreign citizens with useful
information might be dissuaded (through law or simple fear of
reprisals) from providing it to the U.S. government.
A second cost of the divergence between U.S. and European
models is the possibility of regulatory arbitrage. In the absence of
coordination among regulators in these key financial economies,
financial institutions may avert regulation entirely by shifting their
activities to unregulated jurisdictions.282 To illustrate this problem,
consider a second hypothetical. If the United States and all European
Union states were to implement whistleblower programs—but
Switzerland held out—Switzerland would become what Professor
John Coffee calls a “financial casino.”283 Financial institutions that
view whistleblowing as costly or burdensome could move some or all
of their operations to Switzerland to avoid it.284 But precisely because
Switzerland decides not to adopt a whistleblower program, all states
are deprived of Swiss citizens’ inside knowledge about possible
misconduct in Swiss financial institutions. As a hold out, Switzerland
280. See generally GEOFFREY P. MILLER & FABRIZIO CAFAGGI, THE GOVERNANCE
AND REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 58–61 (2013) (discussing the benefits of
public-private ordering in the CDS market).
281. For an overview, see Understanding the Rate-Fixing Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (July 28,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/07/16/business/dealbook/20120716-liborinteractive.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/4Q33-7ZQM (dark archive)].
282. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Extraterritorial Financial Regulation: Why E.T. Can’t
Come Home, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1268–69 (2014) (“[A] nation that persists with
laxer, more permissive rules may be able to attract business and profit as a result of the
regulatory arbitrage that predictably would follow.”).
283. Id. at 1260 (discussing the dilemma where “some nations will find it in their
interest to profit from regulatory arbitrage by offering underregulated havens”).
284. See id. at 1260, 1268–69.
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thus obstructs the international financial community’s interest in early
detection of misconduct that, although perpetrated on Swiss territory,
has the potential to harm markets and institutions worldwide.
Finally, a unilateral, extraterritorial approach may have
significant legal, political, and logistical costs for the United States.
Politically speaking, as a matter of international comity,
extraterritorial regulatory extensions are generally disfavored.285 In
the area of financial law especially, several European nations have
been vocal in their opposition to U.S. efforts to project its rules and
regulations abroad.286 Legally, the United States Supreme Court also
has a dim view of extraterritorial financial regulation, as reflected in
its 2010 decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank.287 There, the
Court held that section 10(b) of the Exchange Act—“the basic
antifraud provision of the U.S. securities laws”288—does not apply
extraterritorially.289 Lower courts have applied that decision broadly
to a wide range of statutes that confer a private right of action for
securities law violations,290 and also the antiretaliation provision of
the Dodd-Frank whistleblower program.291

285. See Wade Estey, Note, The Five Bases of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the
Failure of the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 21 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 177, 178 (1997) (noting that pursuant to the presumption against extraterritoriality,
“Congress does not intend for legislation to contravene the basic legal principles of other
nations” (citing Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 366 U.S. 281, 285 (1949))).
286. Coffee, supra note 282, at 1263–64 (observing European nations’ “concern[s] that
the U.S. approach [with Dodd-Frank] ignored national sovereignty and represented an
alleged return to a prior tradition of U.S. imperialism under which the United States
assumed that its preferred financial practices could be mandated for the rest of the
world”).
287. 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
288. Parkcentral Glob. Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Holdings SE, 763 F.3d 198, 200 (2d
Cir. 2014) (citing Morrison, 561 U.S. at 267).
289. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 265.
290. See, e.g., City of Pontiac Policemen’s & Firemen’s Ret. Sys. v. UBS AG, 752 F.3d
173, 176 (2d Cir. 2014) (rejecting claims that arise out of foreign-issued securities that are
purchased on foreign exchanges even though they are cross-listed on a domestic
exchange); In re UBS Sec. Litig., No. 07-11225, 2011 WL 4059356, at *4–6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
13, 2011) (same); In re Société Générale Sec. Litig., No. 08-2495, 2010 WL 3910286, at *6–
7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2010) (holding that transactions involving American depositary
receipts (“ADRs”) do not qualify as a purchase or sale of a security listed on an American
exchange); see also Hannah L. Bauxbaum, Remedies for Foreign Investors Under U.S.
Federal Securities Law, 75 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 167 (2012) (criticizing the holding
in Société Générale as overreading Morrison).
291. Liu Meng-Lin v. Siemens, AG, 763 F.3d 175, 183 (2d Cir. 2014); Ulrich v. Moody’s
Corp., No. 13-CV-00008 VSB, 2014 WL 4977562, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2014); see also
Recent Case, Second Circuit Holds that Antiretaliation Provision of Dodd-Frank Act Does
Not Apply Extraterritorially, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1826, 1829 (2015).
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Even if these legal and political cost-generating constraints could
be minimized, it would still be unclear whether a unilateral system of
whistleblowing—projected globally by the SEC—is sustainable or
productive. Imagine a world in which the United States aims to
induce information from French and German citizens, which states do
not have robust financial whistleblower programs of their own.
Though speculative, it seems fair to assume that these foreign citizens
will probably be less likely to come forward to U.S. regulatory
authorities, discouraged by their unfamiliarity with U.S. law and the
simple annoyance of making the effort. Further, even if a foreign
national were so inclined, the right incentives may not exist. U.S.
regulators can only reward whistleblowers who provide information
about violations of U.S. law or that which pertains to U.S.
institutions.292 This necessarily means that U.S. regulators could not,
for instance, induce insider information about an ongoing financial
abuse in a major foreign banking institution if that misconduct did not
directly violate U.S. securities law, even if all eight of the U.S. G-SIBs
were counterparties to transactions with that institution.
***
As this Part has argued, there are many benefits to a strong,
broadly scoped financial whistleblowing program. In the first
instance, such a whistleblower program helps regulators overcome
traditional asymmetries in information, expertise, and resources by
leveraging private market actors—particularly in new frontiers of
financial innovation. There are secondary benefits as well, including
efficiency gains, more robust market discipline, and potential
improvement in business conduct. At the same time, whistleblower
programs have real costs—both economic and social. In an effort to
maximize whistleblowing’s benefits, the next Part considers how
certain design improvements might be effective in mitigating
whistleblower programs’ costs. It also briefly considers some
previously made proposals for redesign and suggests why they may be
misguided.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR DESIGN, DISCRETION, AND COORDINATION
Until this point, this Article has highlighted the challenges to
securities law enforcement where financial innovation and its

292. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(a)(1) (2015) (defining whistleblower as an individual that
provides information regarding a “possible violation of the Federal securities laws
(including any rules or regulations thereunder)” (emphasis added)).
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byproduct, diffusion, are concerned. It has suggested that, against
these regulatory challenges, whistleblower programs can be an
effective tool. And indeed, whistleblower programs have expanded as
the darling of postcrisis securities law enforcement. Even so, many
still debate the programs’ merits. To further that debate, the principal
aim of Part II was to probe this postcrisis regulatory intervention with
a revised and retrospective cost-benefit analysis.
This Part evaluates existing, and offers some original, proposals
for whistleblower program design. Section III.A considers additional
requirements that could mitigate some of the costs discussed earlier.
Section III.B evaluates—with some skepticism—suggestions to move
away from a cash incentive scheme as well as the incentives suggested
to replace it. Lastly, Section III.C suggests a path toward greater
transnational coordination around whistleblowing programs.
A. Reporting Requirements
The benefits of whistleblower programs, as earlier discussed, are
significant: not only are whistleblowers effective at detecting
misconduct, these programs can also offer gains in efficiency, industry
ethic, and market discipline, and provide some participatory or
expressive value. This Section argues that several costs of
whistleblower programs—such as their ability to tax regulatory
resources or interfere with firm compliance—can be managed
through revisions in regulatory design.
One straightforward way to mitigate the costs associated with
high volumes of low-quality tips is to impose additional requirements
regarding the use of counsel. In other words, the SEC could require
counsel to act as “gatekeepers” of the whistleblower program.293 The
SEC has, after all, “long sought to enlist professionals as the advance
guard of its Enforcement Division.”294 John Coffee has suggested, for
example, that the SEC impose a certification duty on securities
counsel with respect to corporate disclosures; in particular, Coffee
suggests the SEC “mandate that all disclosure documents filed with it
293. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney As Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC 8
(Columbia Law Sch., Working Paper No. 221, 2003), http://www.law.columbia.edu/center
_program/law_economics/wp_listing_1/wp_listing?exclusive=filemgr.download&file_id=
69110&rtcontentdisposition=filename%3DWP207.pdf [http://perma.cc/8T7E-D4N3] (writing
that “[t]he term ‘gatekeeper’ has been frequently used to describe independent professionals
who serve investors, preparing, verifying, or assessing the disclosures that they receive”).
294. Thomas O. Gorman, The SEC, Gatekeepers and Saying Something, LEXISNEXIS
LEGAL NEWSROOM (Sept. 10, 2015, 8:31 AM), http://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom
/securities/b/securities/archive/2015/09/10/the-sec-gatekeepers-and-saying-something.aspx
[http://perma.cc/T6PB-ZHN3].
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must be signed by an independent attorney, who would acknowledge
his or her responsibility for the preparation or review of the
document.”295
Here too, with respect to the whistleblower program, the SEC
could require whistleblowers to submit tips through counsel. (Counsel
would presumably, in most cases, work on a contingency basis, taking
a portion of the eventual award.) Counsel would be required to
certify, prior to submission, the legitimacy of the tip after engaging in
independent due diligence of the whistleblower’s information.296
Requiring counsel to play a gatekeeping role could reduce the
incidence of low-quality information and, as an added benefit,
streamline the SEC’s task even further by presenting the Commission
with a well-organized and coherent package.
A second design improvement—to reduce compliance-frictional
costs—would be requiring insiders to report misconduct internally
before turning to the SEC. Although the whistleblower rule currently
has no such requirement,297 the SEC considered one in the proposed
rule, and various stakeholders in the industry strongly supported it.298
The likely outcome of a reporting requirement would be a far more
productive attitude in the industry toward the whistleblower program.
It would also be closer in line with the model chosen by our economic
partners abroad. Finally, by devoting resources to strengthening the
industry’s internal whistleblower programs, regulators might play
some role in reducing the industry stigma surrounding whistleblowers
and altering industry norms and perceptions of financial
misconduct.299
B.

Alternative Incentives

Another common design question is whether bounties are an
appropriate and productive incentive. As detractors point out,
incentivizing whistleblowers with cash bounties has costs. For one, the

295. JOHN C. COFFEE JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 349 (2006).
296. Cf. id. (arguing that attorneys can do “due diligence”).
297. SEC Final Rule Release, supra note 87, at 34,301 (“[W]e have determined not to
include a requirement that whistleblowers report violations internally . . . .”).
298. See, e.g., Robert A. Long, David B.H. Martin & Steven E. Fagell, Covington &
Burling LLP, Comment Letter on Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower
Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Feb. 18, 2011),
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-283.pdf [http://perma.cc/2CZR-KA89].
299. See supra Section II.B.5 (discussing the potential for whistleblower programs to
improve business ethics in the financial services industry).
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prospect of a large cash bounty may incentivize frivolous tips.300 There
may also be public policy or social costs that arise from a pay-forinformation scheme.301 The United Kingdom, for example, has
resisted a bounty model for fear that cash rewards would encourage
antisocial behavior, such as malicious reporting and entrapment, and
would have a negative impact on public perception.302 To mitigate the
drawbacks of a purely cash-incentivized scheme, one possible design
modification would thus be a statutory amendment to section 21F,
which gives the SEC more discretion with respect to the kind of
incentives it provides.303
Several proposals along these lines have previously been made.
One possibility is to wholly eliminate or substantially reduce cash
incentives. There is some research to suggest that whistleblowers, at
least generally speaking, are not solely motivated by bounties and
that morality and civic duty play a significant role.304 In the financial
services industry, however, motivating whistleblowers on morality
grounds may be more difficult than in other industries. The problem,
as others have suggested, is that financial misconduct is not always
viewed as a morally reprehensible act. Professor Rapp argued,
[I]n the context of financial fraud the moral need to blow the
whistle is less salient than in other settings, where the decision
to remain silent could compromise health and safety of
employees or customers. Indeed, there is considerable moral
ambiguity surrounding corporate fraud—with white collar
crime not widely perceived as serious moral problem.305

300. See supra Section II.C.2.
301. See supra Sections II.C.1, II.C.3.
302. See BANK OF ENGLAND PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AUTHORITY & FINANCIAL
CONDUCT AUTHORITY, supra note 112, at ¶¶ 5, 29 (declining to adopt U.S.-style cash
awards).
303. Currently, the Dodd-Frank Act provides that the SEC “shall” provide a bounty to
whistleblowers who meet the various other eligibility criteria. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1)
(2012).
304. See Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative
Effectiveness of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88
TEX. L. REV. 1151, 1178, 1202 (2010) (results suggest “that framing reporting as a
commodity with a price tag attached may actually suppress internally motivated action”
but that may “disappear[] with the introduction of sufficiently high monetary awards”);
Gregory Liyanarchchi & Chris Newdick, The Impact of Moral Reasoning and Retaliation
on Whistle-Blowing: New Zealand Evidence, 89 J. BUS. ETHICS 37, 41 (2009) (“One of the
most important factors that affect an individual’s decision on whistle-blowing is his or her
moral behavior . . . . [I]ndividuals with higher levels of moral reasoning are more likely to
blow the whistle than are individuals with lower levels of moral reasoning.”).
305. See Rapp, supra note 17, at 122 (citing Pamela H. Bucy, Moral Messengers:
Delegating Prosecutorial Power, 59 SMU L. REV 321, 355 (2006)).
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Thus the question remains: in the financial services sector, are
ethics a realistic alternative to cash incentives and would financial
insiders’ moral duty alone yield high volumes of quality information?
Some, like former Attorney General Eric Holder, fear that for a
financial insider whistleblowing may not be worth the risks to one’s
career, reputation, and social status, without substantial cash
rewards.306 It may be, then, that in this context ethical incentives are a
much-needed supplement to—but an incomplete replacement for—
cash rewards.
Perhaps regulators need to find ways to augment the moral
dimension to whistleblowing in finance, with the aim to complement
and strengthen the existing incentive effects of cash bounties. They
could, for example, focus on the development and design of business
school training on whistleblower programs. Regulators could work
with business school faculty and administration to develop modules or
case studies on whistleblower cases, so that financial professionals
develop a sense of whistleblowing as a professional and ethical duty,
rather than as a stigmatized activity.307
Also, by further educating investors, regulators could increase
market pressure for whistleblowing, which might prompt the industry
to develop a sense of ethical professionalism around whistleblowing.
Just as financial firms have, in the past several years, taken their
responsibility to the community and global society more seriously
through movements for corporate social responsibility,308 so too might
firms be encouraged to adopt more socially responsible compliance
programs that educate and encourage their employees about
whistleblowing.
Commentators have also proposed that offering whistleblowers
standing to bring claims in federal court would be a meaningful
incentive. For example, several scholars have proposed that the
306. See Eric H. Holder, Jr., Remarks on Financial Fraud Prosecutions at NYU School of
Law, DOJ (Sept. 7, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-holderremarks-financial-fraud-prosecutions-nyu-school-law [http://perma.cc/R9PHCQ34] (suggesting modifications to the $1.6 million cap for awards under the FIRREA
whistleblower program because the amount “wh[ich] would—by any normal standard—be
considered a windfall . . . is unlikely to induce an employee to risk his or her lucrative
career in the financial sector”); see also Rapp, supra note 17, at 113–18 (discussing the
economic and social costs for individual whistleblowers).
307. See Gordon & Zaring, supra note 203.
308. See, e.g., JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 2014
(2015), https://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/Corporate-Responsibility/document/jpmc
-cr-2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/T4AG-9HSM]; GOLDMAN SACHS, OUR IMPACT DRIVES
GLOBAL PROCESS: SELECTED HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE 2014 ESG REPORT (2015),
http://www.goldmansachs.com/citizenship/esg-reporting/ [http://perma.cc/X8ZB-FB2U].
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statute be amended or augmented to include a qui tam–like
provision.309 These proponents of a qui tam model argue that giving
whistleblowers standing to bring suit would be compelling, by offering
whistleblowers “public vindication” and the “chance to tell their
stories and . . . restore their reputations.”310 And, in their view, it
would remove the disincentive that the inability to bring a claim
creates, by assuring whistleblowers that they would not have to
“fight” to get their “fair share” of the award.311 Again, however, as
with morality alone, it is unclear whether financial whistleblowers
would be sufficiently motivated by a qui tam provision over the long
term. Some would, to be sure, but the bulk of financial insiders more
likely prefer to blow the whistle anonymously to avoid the
professional and social consequences of doing so.
In sum, while cash bounties may give rise to some costs, the cost
of eliminating (or even reducing) them may be greater. In view of the
unique circumstances and characteristics of employment in the
financial services industry today, dispensing with cash incentives
altogether may append the program’s fledgling success. U.S.
regulators should, however, be mindful of and open to revisiting the
bounty-driven nature of the program. Supplementary incentives could
ultimately result in a more socially optimal design and appeal to a
broader range of potential whistleblowers.
C.

Transnational Coordination

As earlier discussed, the Commission’s unilateral, extraterritorial
approach has also given rise to additional costs and possibly made the
program less effective than it otherwise could be. This Section thus
argues that international coordination is more desirable (and less
costly) than extraterritorialism. It also suggests a way to accomplish
such coordination through international financial regulatory
networking institutions.
The United States’ penchant for unilateral extraterritorialism
could likely be significantly reduced if the existing international
networking institutions were better able to broker coordination
among the relevant states. As John Coffee points out, the
extraterritorial provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act were in large part
309. See, e.g., Rapp supra note 17, at 145 (proposing an “Informers Act” in which
whistleblowers would have standing to seek fines that are owed to the government);
Garrett, supra note 217, at 781, 787 n.96.
310. See Rapp, supra note 17, at 78, 140.
311. Garrett, supra note 217, at 781–82 (noting that similar disincentives already exist
under the IRS’s whistleblower program).
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motivated by Congress’s concern that “meaningful reform on the
international level faced interminable delays before a sufficient
international consensus could be reached.”312 A more efficient and
effective international regulatory framework might thus satisfy
national regulators who are eager to plug the gaps in securities law as
applied to global institutions, counteracting these states’ desire to
regulate and enforce with an extraterritorial reach.313
This effort could perhaps most productively begin with work at
the International Organization of Securities Organizations
(“IOSCO”). IOSCO is an international standard-setter in the
securities area.314 It is comprised of national securities regulators that
regulate over ninety-five percent of securities markets worldwide.315
The impetus for the development of this organization was, as Chris
Brummer describes it, “the rapid internationalization of securities
markets” and the reality that “financial globalization enabled greater
mobility of fraudsters.”316 For that reason, “authorities wanted to
ensure both robust (and common) approaches to securities regulation
and sufficient cooperation to enforce national rules when criminals,
evidence, and witnesses were in other countries.”317 This past year
alone, IOSCO focused on converging regulatory policy regarding
transparency in the credit default swaps market,318 researching the
timeliness and frequency of disclosure to investors,319 and
standardizing a code of conduct for credit rating agencies.320
IOSCO also focuses on issues of financial misconduct in the
global securities markets. In June 2015, it published a report on
credible deterrence, identifying “key enforcement factors that may
312. Coffee, supra note 282, at 1262.
313. Id. at 1263 n.9 (recounting EU efforts at extraterritorialism).
314. See About IOSCO, INT’L ORG. SEC. COMMISSIONS, https://www.iosco.org/about
/?subsection=about_iosco [http://perma.cc/5A39-AEEM].
315. Id.; see INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, FACT SHEET 3 (2015), https://www.iosco
.org/about/pdf/IOSCO-Fact-Sheet.pdf [http://perma.cc/K39R-DHXT].
316. BRUMMER, supra note 166, at 77.
317. Id.
318. INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, POST-TRADE TRANSPARENCY IN THE CREDIT
DEFAULT
SWAPS
MARKET
40
(2015), http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf
/IOSCOPD499.pdf [http://perma.cc/3BJ5-PYT8].
319. INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, THEMATIC REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION ON
THE TIMELINESS AND FREQUENCY OF DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS ACCORDING TO
PRINCIPLES 16 AND 26 OF THE IOSCO OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES
REGULATION 12–15 (2015), http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD498.pdf
[http://perma.cc/TV86-ST96].
320. INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, CODE OF CONDUCT FUNDAMENTALS FOR CREDIT
RATING AGENCIES 4 (2015), https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD482
.pdf [http://perma.cc/X8MZ-9BKU].
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deter misconduct in international securities and investment
markets.”321 This report did address whistleblowers, though in a
rather perfunctory fashion. It noted that “[w]histleblowers are a
useful source of information and intelligence” and that “[r]eporting
can be enhanced when jurisdictions provide legal protection to
whistleblowers to prevent them from being adversely impacted or
prejudiced as a result of providing information.”322 The report did not
take a position on whether strong whistleblower programs—those
with cash incentives—are more effective and efficient than more
passive programs. Rather, it merely presented the two models—the
U.S. and European—side by side.323
There are likely political economy reasons for the lack of clear
recommendation surrounding a strong whistleblower solution. Even
so, IOSCO arguably could play more of a leadership role by
undertaking a concrete analysis of the costs and benefits of both
models and then setting a standard—or best practices—for
whistleblower programs to which its member-state regulators would
be expected to adhere. Beyond setting a standard for whistleblower
programs, IOSCO could also provide standards for international
coordination of national whistleblower programs through a
Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding (“MMoU”). A
whistleblower MMoU could, for example, provide a procedure for
enabling citizens of various jurisdictions to share inside information
with regulatory authorities both domestically and abroad—even if it
did not settle the transatlantic debate over cash incentives.324
The FSB is another international financial regulatory institution
that acts as an “agenda setter.”325 The FSB—formerly the Financial
Stability Forum—was given a heightened mandate after the crisis.
Today, the FSB plays a significant role in influencing the domestic

321. Press Release, Int’l Org. of Sec. Comm’ns, IOSCO Publishes Report on Credible
Deterrence Approaches in Securities Market Regulation 1 (June 17, 2015), https://www.iosco
.org/news/pdf/IOSCONEWS383.pdf [http://perma.cc/5BL3-R2L8].
322. INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, CREDIBLE DETERRENCE IN THE ENFORCEMENT
OF SECURITIES REGULATION 18 (2015), http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf
/IOSCOPD490.pdf [http://perma.cc/R2EZ-3YF7].
323. Id.
324. Much information sharing is already conducted between enforcement authorities
through various Memoranda of Agreement and Assistance Treaties. See Mary Jo White, The
Challenge of Coverage, Accountability and Deterrence in Global Enforcement, SEC (Oct. 1
2014),
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370543090864
[http://perma.cc
/2AUM-A4FL].
325. See BRUMMER, supra note 166, at 72.
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regulatory agendas of most major financial economies.326 In general,
the FSB is charged with promoting standards, engendering what it
describes as a “race to the top” worldwide in the implementation of
best practices.327 A significant part of this mission is monitoring and
evaluating adherence to international standards.328
Thus, IOSCO and the FSB can be viewed as complementary
institutions. Where IOSCO is principally focused on research,
analysis, and the development of sector-specific standards, the FSB is
focused on financial stability and international cooperation more
broadly. In light of their respective institutional capacities, it would be
important for the FSB and IOSCO to work together to set standards
for and then coordinate a transnational whistleblower policy. As part
of the FSB mandate, the FSB could thus complement the standardsetting work of IOSCO by working with individual jurisdictions to
transition to a more robust whistleblower paradigm and,
subsequently, coordinating information sharing that such regimes
might yield on the domestic level.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that regulators face new—and everchanging—challenges in contemporary financial markets, which are
increasingly innovative, complex, and diffuse. Old models of
securities law enforcement, which are primarily reactive, have quickly
become outdated; proactively anticipating misconduct is key to the
health of and confidence in the financial markets. Yet regulatory
agility in innovative financial spaces can be difficult to achieve;
regulatory gaps largely stand in the way. Inherently, regulators
operate at a disadvantage in terms of information, resources, and
expertise. They thus require assistance from the private market itself.
Whistleblowers have proven a viable solution to these modernday challenges that financial innovation poses to regulation and
enforcement. As a regulatory tool, whistleblowers complement state
power by contributing the private market’s resources and knowledge
to the task of curbing misconduct. Specifically, in weighing the
benefits against the costs, this Article argues that whistleblower
solutions are a desirable regulatory choice from the perspective of
326. See About the FSB, FIN. STABILITY BOARD, http://www.financialstabilityboard
.org/about/ [http://perma.cc/3A2M-XP2Z].
327. Id.
328. See FIN. STABILITY BD., PROMOTING GLOBAL ADHERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION AND INFORMATION EXCHANGE STANDARDS 1 (Mar. 2010), http://www
.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r_100310.pdf [http://perma.cc/975L-F4X7].
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stability, efficiency, public welfare, and business ethics. Moreover, this
Article urges greater movement toward transnational cooperation or
the convergence of whistleblowing programs. As innovation in the
industry—along with the complexity and diffusion that it brings—will
no doubt continue, internationally coordinated whistleblower
programs are an ideal tool for addressing misconduct in global
finance. Ultimately, then, this Article not only offers concrete ways to
improve whistleblower program design domestically but also suggests
a way to effectuate much-needed international coordination around
the whistleblower solution through the framework of international
financial regulation.

